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MERCOSUR as an Instrument
for Development
Jorge M. Guira*
In July 1990, Argentina and Brazil announced their intention to form a common mar-
ket, MERCOSUR or Mercosul (Portuguese), by 1995.1 Later that year, Paraguay and
Uruguay asked to become part of this integration process.2 On March 26, 1991, Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asunci6n (Treaty), establishing each of
the signatories' intention to create a united common market by December 31, 1994.3 This
common market, pursuant to Article 1 of the Treaty of Asunci6n, provides for the free
movement of goods, services, capital, and labor by the end of the December 31, 1994 tran-
sition period. 4 The MERCOSUR signatories also proposed the establishment of a com-
mon external tariff (CET), coordination of macroeconomic policies, and harmonization of
national legislation. 5 Of these four objectives, the establishment of a CET (albeit with
Jorge M. Guira, B.A., M.A., J.D. (UF), LL.M. (Lond.), Research Fellow in Latin American
Financial Law, London Institute of International Banking, Finance and Development Law, Centre
for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London. This
paper represents an initial review of current developments in MERCOSUR in a cross-discipli-
nary context. It is the beginning to an extended treatment of the above subject, under the super-
vision of Professor J.J. Norton, S.J.D., D. Phil., the Sir John Lubbock Professor of Banking Law at
the Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of
London. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Norton in the prepara-
tion of this paper. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author alone.
1. Acta de Buenos Aires, 15 INTEGRACION LAnNO AMERICANA 67 (1990).
.2. Thomas A. O'Keefe, An Analysis of the MERCOSUR Economic Integration Project from a Legal
Perspective, 28 INT'L. LAw. 439,439 (1994).
3. Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, Arg.-Braz.-Para. Uru., 30 I.L.M. 1041
(hereinafter Treaty of Asunci6n].
4. Id
5. 1d; Thomas A. O'Keefe, MERCOSUR: The Next Steps, Address at the American Bar Association
(ABA) Young Lawyers Division Conference on MERCOSUR: The New Common Market of the
Southern Cone, with Perspectives from the European Union and the NAFTA (Feb. 12, 1995). It
should be noted, however, that over 9,000 types of goods will come in force under the CET.
International Agreements; Presidents of MERCOSUR Nations Ratify Common External Tariffs, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1268 (Aug. 17, 1994).
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myriad exceptions) and the free movement of goods has been largely achieved.6
Membership into MERCOSUR may be created by utilizing various different meth-
ods. MERCOSUR signatories may allow member states of the parallel organization, the
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), to become full members of MERCO-
SUR.7 Another option is associate membership through a so called "4 + 1, or Rose
Garden agreement" by which states join and receive the benefits of free trade without
being locked in to the CET.8
Because of MERCOSUR's dear, although limited success, Chile recently sought and
was accepted as an associate member of MERCOSUR- 9 However, the case of Chile, full
membership was problematic since its external tariff rates average 11 percent compared to
the MERCOSUR wide 14 percent average. This issue, among others, proved a stumbling
block in building a full partnership.
Bolivia further joined Chile10 as an associate member and several other Latin American
states, including Venezuela and Mexico, are seeking closer ties with MERCOSUR." I
Additionally, MERCOSUR is attempting to integrate with other subregional and regional
organizations, induding the Andean Pact in Latin America. 12 Important example is the sign-
ing of a new cooperation agreement between MERCOSUR and the European Union (E.U.).13
6. It should be noted that the common external tariff averages 14% and is levied on all imports to
MERCOSUR from non-MERCOSUR countries. It covers approximately 80% of products
imported to MERCOSUR. Over 9,000 separate products are included on this list, which includes
approximately 80% of the products reviewed in the post-Treaty process period. Moreover, MER-
COSUR has seen the implementation of a separate customs agreement through which the signa-
tories have agreed to freely circulate 90% of products exchanged between them as of January
1996. The remaining products will contain limitations up to the year 2000 and an agreement
exists to appoint working groups to harmonize limitation of government policies which hinder
competition in this regard. Laura C. Reyes M., Beyond NAFTA-South/Central, NAFTA L. Rzv.,
Spring 1995, at 150-151. See also Reuter Textline, BBC Monitoring Service, Aug. 8, 1995 (list of
CET exceptions to be prepared); Michael Reid, A Survey of MERCOSUR: The End of the
Beginning-MERCOSUR Has Achieved Surprisingly Swift Success, But There is Plenty More to Do,
Oct. 12, 1996; Stephen Fidler, Survey-MERCOSUR Trade Pact Sets the Pace for Integration, FiN.
TIMES, Feb. 4,1997.
7. Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association, Aug. 12, 1980,20
I.L.M. 672 [hereinafter Treaty of Montevideo of 1980].
8. See <http://.embassy.orgluruaguay/econ/MERCOSUR>. The agreement was signed at the White
House Rose Garden in the United States. Id. This event was possible because of the Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative, which set up free trade areas throughout the hemisphere and is dis-
cussed in Parts III and IV, infa.
9. 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.27, at 1096 (July 3, 1996).
10. 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1647 (Oct. 23, 1996).
11. 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1348 (Aug. 21, 1996); Reid, supra note 6 at P. 16.
12. Reid, supra note 6, at 16.
13. David Haskel, Latin Reforms, Democracy Draw European Investment, THE REUTER
EUR.COMMUNITY REP., Apr.17, 1996. See also MERCOSUR Discussions with Andean Pact, Reuter
Textlne, Apr.18, 1996. ASEAN Seeking Closer Ties with MERCOSUR, Reuter Textline Business
Times Malaysia, Apr. 27, 1996. See also O'Keefe, supra note 5, at 7,11 (discussing ties with NAFTA
and the EU).
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The above pattern of expansion shows that states and regional entities increasingly
recognize MERCOSUR as a viable legal institution towards which closer economic ties
appear viable. The reason for this interest is unmistakable; MERCOSUR represents a
potential market of over 200 million persons, $800 billion annual gross domestic product,
and growth in intraregional trade that has been rapidly accelerating in the 1990s. 14
As a result of this growth, commentators typically perceive MERCOSUR as a key ele-
ment of positive legal and economic reforms promoted by member states. 15 However,
whether MERCOSUR will expand its institutional infrastructure beyond its minimalist
form and establish a supranational bank 16 or attain sustained expansion is questionable.
Accordingly, this article explores whether MERCOSUR's new legal order can lead to signif-
icant economic integration. 17
Part I provides a conceptual framework to identify how law, in the context of MERCO-
SUR, can serve as an instrument of development, through legal rulemaking, institution-
building, and expanding linkages with other nations as well as subregional and regional
organizations. Part II analyzes the core tension between economic liberalism and conser-
vatism, which constrains sustainable national development in Latin America. Next, Part III
describes how MERCOSUR, as a generator of legal rules, is affecting intraregional legal unifi-
cation and harmonization. Part IV discusses how MERCOSUR's institutional framework
can provide an instrument for development, with particular attention to the dispute resolu-
tion mechanism. Further, Part V examines how MERCOSUR is positioned to grow with
respect to other countries and regional entities in the Southern and Northern hemisphere.
Finally, Part VI assesses how MERCOSUR is a legal instrument of development.
14. U. Celli, Jr., The Formation and Consolidation of MERCOSUR, Cl, 5, Address at the ABA Young
Lawyers Division Conference on MERCOSUR (Feb. 15, 1995) (on file with author). See, e.g.,
INTER-AM. DEv. BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA REPORT (1993); INTER-
AM. DEv. BANK WORLD OUTLOOK (1995); INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1995). MERCOSUR trade has grown three fold between 1990-1994, from
U.S. $4.1 billion to $10.7 billion. <http: I1 www. iadb.org./idb/int/intpub/nota/mero.htm's.>
15. For an interesting discussion of the parameters of an emerging debate as to whether the growth
in intra-MERCOSUR trade has arisen due to protectionism which threatens distortions in trade
(and thereby reflects the historical pattern of liberalism-conservatism, in oscillation), compare
Guy de Jonquieres, World Bank Softens Criticism of MERCOSUR, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1996 with
Guy de Jonquieres, MERCOSUR Trade Group under Fire, FIN. TIMES, OCt. 24, 1996.
16. See Reid, supra note 6. See also MERCOSUR Countries to Establish Supranational Bank and
Court, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 980 (June 12, 1996); Geoff Dyer, MERCOSUR Plans
Regional Bank, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1996 (discussing future bank's conceptualization).
17. See Joseph J. Norton, Law and Economic Development in the Emerging C.E.E. Economies -- The
Case of Securities Regulation -- A New Frontier of Challenges for Applied Comparative Law
Methodology, Address at the Emerging Financial Markets and IFIs Conference (on file with
author); Reid, supra note 6. See also John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On
the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movemen 25 AM. J. COMP. L.
457 (1977); Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles
under a Nafta Based System, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 127 (1995).
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I. Law as an Instrument of Economic and Political Development:
Defining the Core Issues.
A. THE PROCESS OF LEGAL REFORM.
Legal reform does not exist in a vacuum. 18 Rather, legal reform is a product of social,
economic, and political experience. MERCOSUR, as a Latin American legal reform pro-
ject, emerges from the historical forces which have shaped the development of member
states and the region. At the same time, however, MERCOSUR is a unique and new crea-
ture because it is: (1) part of a sweeping, ongoing regional and hemispheric liberalization
effort; and (2) a project of geographical scope which extends across the diverse, and fre-
quently divided, Southern Cone. Consequently, MERCOSUR represents a potential
important departure from the constraints of a complex Latin American history.
The first element in this overall conceptual framework is understanding how the his-
tory and the current economic and political situation affects the process of legal reform. 19
The process of legal reform is defined as the means towards which law is used as an instru-
ment to achieve certain ends. In its' regional historical dimension, the focus is the persis-
tent tension between economic liberalism and conservatism in Latin America. This factor
sets the stage for how the legal reform process affects economic and political
development.20
18. See Norton, supra note 17, at 9-10.
19. For a discussion of the concept of the impact of law and development on developing countries
and the process therein, see David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the
Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L. J. 1 (1972). See also LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (Anthony
Carty ed., 1992). Part 1 of the above edited volume contains a useful introduction to the Law
Reform process, in particular the setting of useful rules for diverse societies with transplanted
legal ideas. A good review of the latest methodological developments in law and development
and allied fields is J. Trachtman, The Applicability of Law and Economics to Law and Development:
The Case of Financial Law, in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Joseph J. Norton & M. Andenas eds., 1996). In this article, J. Trachtman
discusses the emphasis on maximizing social welfare through reduction of transaction costs as
the sina qua non of the new "comparative institutionalists" who seek to apply culturally sensitive
law and economics analysis to the resolution of law and economic development problems.
Although not expressly modeled on this approach, the analysis of MERCOSUR here adopts
many of the institutionalists' insights by seeking to identify the core tensions in society and then
analyzing whether the legal, institutional, and policy devices in place can help resolve these prob-
lems. Implicit in this work is the assumption that only a modest, regionally sensitive theory can
explain the main reasons for underdevelopment, and that only through a series of processes to
gain awareness of these problems and then set incentive mechanisms to cure these problems to
grapple with each element one by one.
20. Trubeck, supra note 19 at 22, 24. See also Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can
American Law and Legal Institutions Help Developing Countries, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 767 (1972).
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B. THE SETTING OF LEGAL NORMS AND RULES.
The second element of analysis is understanding that legal reform deals with creating,
building, and maintaining norms of conduct in an institutional setting. Norms, those
written as well as unarticulated, are means of deciding legal issues. They consist in part of
formal rules. In the case of MERCOSUR legal reform, the process of developing norms
and law starts with member states.
Member states, through MERCOSUR decision-making bodies, set legal rules which
codify the formal norms of the institution.21 This exercise of state or organizational power
creates, produces, and maintains a legal order which is made of formal rules and custom as
well as the means to interpret these rules and custom. Additionally, an enforcement sys-
tem administers the rules and ensures fidelity to the purpose and intent of the law.
An integration scheme, such as MERCOSUR, also has a hierarchy of law.22 At the
highest level is the law of the institution. This law consists of a treaty and other protocols
and agreements signed by authorized representatives of member states which apply to all
states. Depending on the interpretation of such law, it may also have an effect in national
legal regimes.23 The next level is national law. This law governs economic relationships
within each country, except to the extent that MERCOSUR law is supreme.24 National law
also includes choice of law rules or private international law governing cross border trans-
actions. A third level which may exist is public international law for signatories' commit-
ments to internationally accepted norms of conduct and institutional law, such as the
United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
the historical norms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 25
When legal reformers confront these different layers of law, a typical objective is har-
monization and unification of laws to reduce transaction costs in cross-border transac-
tions.26 Thus, it is important to see how the three levels of law contribute to the overall
legal framework of integration. The particular focus is identifying the dimensions of
21. See Trubek, supra note 19, at 22,24.
22. M. EKMEKDJIAN, INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO COMMUNITARIO LATINO AMERICANO CON ESPECIAL
REFERENCIA AL MERCOSUR (1994).
23. Id. at 263-64.
24. Id. at 264-71. For an extensive discussion of this aspect of the unification and harmonization of
law, see Alejandro M. Garro, Unification and Harmonization of Private Law in Latin America, 40
AM. J. CoMp. L. 587 (1992). This highly complex area is one which is the unique province of
lawyers schooled in conflicts of law analysis and a specific understanding of the historical, cultur-
al, and social forces which shape legal discourse and development.
25. This is particularly true in a dynamic historical setting like Latin America which is the product
of substantial diversity (e.g., Indian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, Roman, English, and
American).
26. See generally Trachtman, supra note 19, at 35-37. Indeed, the transaction cost reducing model
builds on the work of R. Coase that societies which learn how to reduce such social costs to an
efficient level thrive. Institutionalists choose to use a broader overall definition which looks at
the reduction of such costs. It is therefore implicit in analysis that reduction of costs, such as tar-
iff barriers, will produce superior benefits to society.
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MERCOSUR law, showing how such law may affect domestic law, and exploring the tenta-
tive harmonization efforts undertaken thus far. The potential of such effort in moderating
the tension between economic conservatism and liberalism is discussed in the correspond-
ing institution-building part.
C. THE BUILDING OF INSTITUTIONS.
The third element of analysis is examining the institution-building aspects of MER-
COSUR. Analyzing institution-building entails consideration of how policy decisions are
made, implemented, and resolved when disputes arise. This is an important dimension of
integration because formal rules and custom can only succeed if an effective decision-'
making process and dispute resolution mechanism exists. The degree to which an institu-
tion implements the intent of founders' legislation and administers the law reveals a great
deal about norms and the true role of rules in the integration system. For example, mea-
suring and comparing the degree of transparency rather than opaqueness in decision-
making reveals the accountability of MERCOSUR institutions in practice. This, in turn,
helps uncover the operational code of behavior in the MERCOSUR project. It can there-
fore expose the tensions between liberalization and protectionism in decision-making.
Similarly, focusing on the procedural aspects of dispute resolution can illuminate the role
of power versus law in this particular process.
D. THE EXPANSION OF THE INTEGRATION CORE.
A fourth element of analysis is determining whether MERCOSUR has a sufficient
legal and institutional predicate to facilitate growth in trade and sustainable development.
This question must be considered because the viability of an integration scheme centers
around expansion. Accordingly, how core members create linkages with different states
and subregional and regional integration schemes is an important focus.
MERCOSUR states face fundamental policy choices regarding whether they should
integrate further with states from the North or the South. 27 Currently, considerable debate
in the academy and policy circles arises over whether North - South integration is prefer-
able to South - South integration. The openness of MERCOSUR's architecture to facilitate
such linkages as well as its appreciation of the legal, economic, and geo-political factors,
which help decision-makers evaluate the most desirable trade linkage alternative, are
important elements of MERCOSUR's problems and prospects for success.
E. THE SUM OF THE PARTS.
The above approach builds upon the methodological contributions of historians, econ-
omists, and lawyers, without narrowly following a particular track or "school" of analysis.
Historical analysis is used as the base because of the apparent persistence of a conservative-
liberal tension which drives policymaking and because it simultaneously promotes atten-
tiveness to the unique cultural and economic conditions of Latin America generally and the
MERCOSUR member states specifically. This analysis is particular-ly relevant to the current
situation because the current debate as to the efficacy of MERCOSUR focuses not only on
27. See, e.g., J. DE MELO & A. PANAGARIYA, THE NEW REGIONALISM IN TRADE POLICY (1992).
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whether trade is being created beween the states, but also whether growth of trade within
the walls of MERCOSUR is attained at the expense of global competitiveness. 28 At least one
experienced international trade economist perceives that parties who do not use MERCO-
SUR as a platform are being shut out of the trade picture due to tariff barriers, with the
result that internal liberalization is external conservatism for parties who do not plant a
base in MERCOSUR as part of business strategy.29 Legal analysis shows what the key rules
are and how they are interconnected to each other. Institutional analysis is used with an eye
toward critical analysis of how the relevant bodies facilitate social interactions which reduce
transaction costs. In particular, the focus is on how MERCOSUR and relevant national and
international instititutions can constrain the historical tensions which exist and help the
respective member states achieve greater efficiency and equity in their commercial relation-
ships. In this regard, the "institutional analysis" builds upon the insights of history as well
as economics in discovering whether MERCOSUR's foundations will allow it to grow
strong.30 A review of the prospects for expansion draws on the insights of trade theory and
recent diplomatic history to expose the options which MERCOSUR faces and assess their
implications for development. An historical discussion is the first step towards explaining
the confluence of the above analysis.
II. Resolution of Economic and Historical Barriers and Tensions.
A. BACKGROUND.
A consistent theme in the national history of Latin American states is the tension
between economic liberalism and conservatism. 31 Economic liberals welcome foreign
investment and the development of a market economy in a democratic state. Economic
conservatives prefer state intervention and typically seek to restrict foreign ideas and influ-
ences which open the economy and society to outside economic and political forces. This
factual context is crucial.32 Whether the focus is the history of national economic devel-
opment or subregional integration, decisionmakers' primary question is how to best har-
ness the region's export-oriented economies for the benefit of society.
28. See the discussion of this important emerging issue in the two articles by de Jonquires, supra note
14. A response from libertarian quarters suggesting that trade creation rather than trade diversion
is the most significant underlying economic development taking place is in Edward L. Hudgins,
MERCOSUR Gets "Not Guilty" on Trade Diversion, WALL ST. J. EUR., Mar. 24, 1997, at 10.
29. Hudgins, supra note 28.
30. See J. Trachtman, supra note 19, at 29-32 (discussing the importance of Douglass North's pio-
neering work as to the centrality of transaction costs to achieving development in society).
31. THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA (3d ed. 1992).
32. This general theme is explored in detail in Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle:
The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1995).
See also DAVID BUSHNELL & NEILL MACAULAY, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN LATIN AMERICA IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (1992).
33. SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 31, at 11-14.
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The persistent tension between liberalism and conservatism is further evident in the
economic and political history of Argentina and Brazil. But other important factors
inform the prospects for economic integration.33 Additionally, a general, persistent Latin
American distrust of a major trading partner, the United States, exists. This distrust of for-
eign ideas usually manifests itself in ambivalence. Nationalistic antipathy toward too close
an embrace with its Northern neighbor arises while countries simultaneously pursue
North American or Western European style "technical" progress. 34
Moreover, neighboring Latin Americans have harbored deep suspicions about each
other. This suspicion has led to political conflict, including war. Regional fragmentation,
rather than integration, has therefore been the rule rather than the exception. Concerns
about protecting national sovereignty and avoiding foreign economic dependancy have
also quashed many national ambitions for crossborder economic alliance.35 As a result,
hemispheric, regional, and sub-regional integration efforts, despite many attempts, have
invariably failed.
This state of affairs summarizes the context for national and international relation-
ships leading up to the signing of the MERCOSUR project and its' implementation. It can
provide important clues about the enhanced prospects for sustainable development via
MERCOSUR.
Moreover, because Argentina and Brazil are the two most important member states in
MERCOSUR, these two states deserve special attention with respect to their place within
this theoretical regional context. Consequently, these states are featured throughout the
discussion and highlighted in subsection II(C).
34. Id.
35. Rich and extensive literature exists on direct foreign investment in Latin America. A detailed dis-
cussion of historical and current means to control foreign investment is discussed in Joseph J.
Jova et al., Private Investment in Latin-America: Renegotiating the Bargain, 19 TEx. INT'L. L. J. 3,
12-13 (1984). A voluminous literature exists on'export and foreign capital dependency.
Dependency theory has many different aspects to it but the primary point of view is that Latin-
American economies are at the mercy of economies of the North because they are at the periph-
ery of the international trading system. Accordingly, they do not have the resources to maintain
an equal bargaining position in their dealings with the outside, more advanced industrial world.
This leads to a variety of pernicious deals in which domestic elites work with foreign elites to
enrich themselves to the detriment of others in the population. See, e.g. FERNANDO CARDOSO &
ENzO FALET-TO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (M.M. Urquidi trans., 1979);
LATIN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE WITH DEPENDENCY AND BEYOND (Ronald H. Chilcote & Joel C.
Edelstein eds., 1974); ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA (1967); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM: CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD ECONOMY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1974); PETER
EVANS, DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT, THE ALLIANCE OF MULTINATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL CAPITAL IN
BRAZIL (1979).
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B. THE FIVE PHASES OF MODERN LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
PERSISTENT TENSION OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISM VERSUS STATE INTERVENTION
IN EXPORT ORIENTED ECONOMIES.
Since its early 19th century independence from the colonial empires of Spain and
Portugal, outsiders to the region have often viewed Latin America as "the land of tomor-
row" 36 These early 19th century revolutionary governments varied widely in their politi-
cal organization and their economic policymaking. 37 One constant, however, remained;
policy veered from the tenets of liberalism to a conservative reaction.
Economic liberals, during this.pre-modern period, focused on the creation of open
market policies and the promotion of capital, including foreign investment. 38 By contrast,
economic conservatives favored development of domestic trade and sought protection for
local agriculture, artisan, and craftsman industries.
Concepts of economic liberalism throughout the period were borrowed from coun-
tries in the midst of mass production industrialization, particularly England and France.
European liberal concepts of openness to the global economy were heavily influenced by
the need for these advanced manufacturing states to export. But unlike the advanced
nations of Western Europe, Latin America had not yet undergone significant industrializa-
tion.
Indeed, large scale industrialization did not really begin in Latin America until the
1930s, well after the importation of liberal concepts concerning the role of the state and
markets in contemporary economies.39 Conservatives, either because of nationalism or
strong interests in the fate of domestic industries, reacted strongly to transplanted liberal
ideas and policies. Direct state intervention, with a tightening of the entry and exit rules
for foreign investment and nationalization of selected industries, followed the conserva-
tives'recurring rise to power and influence. 4°
This pattern of liberal-conservative "cycles" exists today. Amy Chua, for example,
argues that many Latin American states are currently undergoing their fifth cycle - a resur-
gence of liberalism, dressed up as privatization.41
Regional scholars have also periodized Latin American economic growth and devel-
opment, primarily based on changes in the export orientation of the economy.42 These
cycles sometimes correspond to the above articulated patterns of liberal-conservative
ascendancy and decline.
The starting point for chronicling economic growth and development is during the
1850s. When national governments consolidated their power and increased integration
36. See SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 31, at 382.
37. See BUSHNELL & MACAULAY, supra note 32, at 22-32.
38. Id.
39. See LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES: GROwTH IN THE EXPORT SECTOR, 1880-1930 (Roberto Cortes
Conde & Shane Hunt eds., 1985).
40. See generally Chua, supra note 32. Chua's article focuses on ethnic tensions just underneath the
surface which are exacerbated by the repeated cycles of privatization and liberalization.
Therefore, as some observers feel, liberalization does not represent a panacea for development.
41. Id.
42. SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 31, at 43-66.
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into the global economy was the defining economic characteristic. This phase of develop-
ment led directly to the first "modern" period, from 1880-1900, which began the Latin
American pattern of export-led growth in a few primary products. 43
The historical record during this first modern period also reflects a tendency toward
the centralization of political authority. Liberals, of course, championed economic devel-
opment through export growth.44 Such political promotion helped attract and maintain
foreign capital flows. Foreign capitalists welcomed liberal centralism because they believed
it provided safety for their financial interests and was closely tied to overall political stabili-
ty. Domestic oriented interest groups sometimes opposed liberalism because its propo-
nents wanted to open up the domestic market to their detriment.
The second phase from 1900 - 1930 was a period of expansion in export import trade,
consolidation of centralism, and with it, prosperity.45 Argentina, for example, had a grow-
ing economy and a standard of living for its citizens which was on a par with Australia and
the United States.46 Brazil's coffee and rubber-based primary products economy was also
growing, but this prosperity was not widely shared.47 Liberalism did not bring progress
without a price: the price being increased poverty and a multi-tiered, but not always social-
ly mobile, society. Consequently, liberalism waned in influence as nationalism grew in
response to the wide and uneven distribution of international trade profits. 48
One aspect of increasing disenchantment from liberalism was that domestic agricul-
tural interest groups increasingly clamored for protection from the threat of international
competition. 49 Such groups successfully protected their stake in foreign trade through
these tactics. As a result, competing voices, advocating spending scarce state resources in
the growing industrial sector, did not stand a chance. 50 This conflict did not help a
domestic industry which lacked the ability to compete in the global economy with reason-
ably priced products. Moreover, industrial interest groups lacked the power to bargain,
either internally or internationally, for the kind of investment needed to succeed in the
industrial marketplace.5 1 Consequently, development of this sector lagged.
In the 1930s, a third phase began, featuring import substitution industrialization
(ISI). This phase, lasting through the 1960s, was marked by many shifts in state policy
43. Id
44. Id.
45. Id. at 48-53.
46. CARLOS F. DIAZALEJANDRO, ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC (1970);
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARGENTINA 1880 - 1946 (Guido di Tella & D.C.M. Platt eds., 1986);
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARGENTINA 1946 - 1983 (Guido di Tella & Rudiger Dornbusch eds., 1989)
(useful for comparison purposes of the earlier economic period).
47. E. BRADFORD BURNS, A HISTORY OF BRAZIL (3d ed. 1993).
48. SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 31, at 49-53.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. VICTOR BULMER-THOMAS, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 194-224
(1994) (general discussion of relationship in different economic sectors between productivity,
interest groups, and other factors).
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toward the treatment of industry.52 ISI is the state's policy of encouraging and protecting
investment in domestic industries and erecting tariff barriers against foreign goods in
order to substitute foreign industrial goods with domestic products. This phase was char-
acterized initially by a diminished international demand for the primary products which
made up the bulk of Latin American trade. However, the fall in demand was not brought
on by a lack of competitiveness. Rather, the international financial collapse of the great
depression meant that the citizens of more advanced western states had less money to
spend thereby diminishing demand. 53
Before the great depression, Latin American policy makers had more or less accepted
liberal ideas uncritically. But exports fell 48 percent from 1930 to 1934 as compared to
1925-29, and this meant that the old pieties of export-led growth gave way to the realities
of a difficult period for international trade.54
Domestic political crisis followed depression. Military leaders took over Argentina,
Brazil and five other countries within a year of the 1929 crisis.55 All the while, a new era in
economic planning and matching legal reform began. States tried to make the transition
from the old liberal, export-led model to a mixed model focusing more on the develop-
ment of domestic industry. Argentina, for example, attempted to keep the best of the old
model with the Roca-Runciman Pact. In this trade deal, the Argentine and the British gov-
ernments agreed to English quotas for Argentine products in exchange for Argentina's
assurances to purchase certain goods and ensure British business interests in Argentina.5 6
At the same time, Argentina and Brazil were actively stimulating industrial develop-
ment through increased state involvement and promotion of industrial growth. Foreign
products now faced even greater barriers. Conservatives, sometimes in the guise of pop-
ulism, usually supported these measures.
The policy of ISI, based on erection of tariff barriers, state purchasing of local goods,
and state run enterprises, was to create a new industrial middle class and elite class.58 But
Latin American products could not compete without expensive imported capital goods
(such as technology) which substantially raised production costs. Latin America also
lacked a broad market beyond its borders. This broader market was highly competitive.5 9
Therefore, inward growth was stunted in the face of these external constraints.
52. Id. at 235, 245, 281. See also SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 31, at 53 56. There is a wealth of
material describing ISI's effect on inhibiting development. The major point is that inward-look-
ing development made less sense than the traditional export-led growth model because Latin
America did not have enough resources to compete productively in the world economy, or, even
if it did, protectionism removed incentives to compete.
53. Id. SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 31, at 53-56.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. BULMER-THOMAS, supra note 51, at 218,238.
57. Id. at 17,234,244.
58. Id.
59. Id. Probably the best survey covering this issue, including the so called structuralist school of
Raul Prebisch and other scholar-advisors, is included in CELso FURTADO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF LATIN AMERICA: A SURVEY FROM COLONIAL TiMEs TO THE CUBAN REVOLUTION (2d. ed 1976).
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The fourth phase from the 1960s through to the 1980s saw even greater stagnation in
ISI growth. The phase was defined by the rise of military governments who tried to con-
trol the rising collective power of labor often without even trying to put a populist face on
their quest for control.60 But maintaining the ISI policy was becoming problematic for
reasons beyond labor unrest. Foreign capital goods needed for growth were expensive and
buginesses which benefitted from the paternal protection of political patrons did not
become more productive.
Accordingly, increased state investment and protection of domestic industries did not
result in further industrial development. Domestic industries lacking a comparative
advantage which could drive down the costs of production faced a steady erosion in their
international competitiveness. At the same time, organized labor started to become more
militant and was demanding concessions to match those of privileged industrialists.61
Governments in many Latin American countries, including Argentina and Brazil, were
faced with stagnant or dedining industries and the challenge of organized labor increas-
ingly demanding higher wages. Latin American governments also faced a fall in interna-
tional lending. Such capital was sorely needed to support the declining flow of revenue in
their regimes.62 Slowly, but inexorably, economic pressure from without and within was
building up.63
In response to this domestic situation, the military stepped in. The result was the rise
of anti-labor internationally-oriented bureaucratic authoritarian governments which tried
to establish stronger ties with international financial institutions and multinational corpo-
rations.64 Such international ties were thought necessary in order to raise capital flows. In
this task, success was achieved, perhaps too well.
The 1970s saw external credit rise dramatically in the financial sector for the stable,
bureaucratic authoritarian regimes of the region. But the lack of financial discipline from
borrowing governments made debt service rise.65 By the end of the decade, debt had risen
from $27 billion to $231 billion, with $18 billion in debt service. 66 Even without major
gains in productivity, this burden might have been sustainable since the nominal rate of
interest on the debt was below the rate of growth of nominal exports. But debt service
which had been 17 percent of exports in 1960, was now 43.4 percent of export earnings
and commodity prices were falling.67 Economic disaster soon followed.
60. Id.
61. See SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 31, at 56-59.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. The financial institutions and multinational corporations which were involved in these
alliances were typically from the United States or other developed creditor countries.
65. There are a variety of books describing the development of so-called bureaucratic authoritarian-
ism. An early influential work is GUILLERMO O'DONNELL, MODERNIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC
AUTHORITARIANISM: STUDIES IN SOUTH AMERICAN POLITIcs (1979). Another useful study is ALFRED
STEPAN, THE MILITARY IN POLITICS: CHANGING PATrERNS IN BRAZIL (1971) (discussing the role of
the military as intervenor in Brazilian politics).
66. SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 31, at 59.
67. Id
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The fifth phase, from 1980s to the present, began by a deepening of the financial and
resulting social crisis until a tortuous path to democratization and reliberalization
emerged.68 The early 1980s, despite the crisis, witnessed even more government borrow-
ing as banks perceived the shortfall in commodity prices making up the export base as
temporary. It was not. By 1982, the debt service to export ratio climbed dramatically to 59
percent. The situation had gone from bad to worse. 69
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) stepped in as international disciplinarian. In
exchange for repudiation of ISI, the IMF helped the region's troubled economies, indud-
ing Argentina and Brazil, by helping them cover their international debt. The basic pro-
gram of IMF was "structural adjustment", which is essentially the same as the "Washington
Consensus" or the New Economic Model (NEM). 70 These programs are based on broad
concepts of liberalizing trade policy, welcoming foreign investment, reducing state inter-
vention, and fighting inflation.
Not surprisingly, these reforms, which induced the pain of economic recession on its
citizens, were unpopular. The military leaders, who were now presiding over increased
unemployment and a general economic recession, now faced increasing discontent and a
narrowing domestic base of support amid the squeezing pressure applied to the society.7 1
Increasing dissent and participation of this middle class in 1990s politics slowly led to
a peaceful transition to democracy and the return of liberal reformers. But now Latin
American citizens voted to take hardship in the short run pursuit of long term gains.
Capital flows in the region consequently resumed with Mexico and Argentina receiving
significant new amounts.72 Bonds and equities replaced syndicated loans as the preferred
form of foreign invesiment.73 Privatization reforms, particularly in Argentina, also began
to take shape, particularly in Argentina but also in various other parts of the region.
However, despite these positive factors or, perhaps, in part, because of them, a new cri-
sis emerged which has had important hemispheric implications. Buoyed by rising foreign
investment, Mexico's currency became increasingly high relative to its underlying value on
the international market, namely, its ability to pay foreign obligations with dollar reserves.
The current account faced a huge deficit. As a consequence, Mexico's current account
dilemma turned into a crisis as the peso devalued. 74 Suddenly illiquid, Mexico struggled
in the face of a massive international lack of confidence in Mexico's international econom-
ic management. As a result, its NAFTA partner, the United States, stepped in with a pack-
68. Id. This is also the thesis of EVANS, supra note 35. Two particular studies which describe the
emergence of financial problems in the 1970s and the 1980s are R. Fernandez, The New Financial
Regime in Latin America, in THE NEW ECONOMIC MODEL IN LATIN AMERICA AND ITS IMPACT ON
INCOME DISrMBUTION AND POVERTY (V. Bulmer-Thomas eds., 1996). See also S. Griffith-Jones,
International Capital Flows to Latin America, in THE NEw ECONOMIC MODEL IN LATIN AMERICA
AND ITS IMPACT ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY (V. Bulmer-Thomas eds., 1996).
69. BULMER-THOMAS, supra note 51, at 363-365.
70. This basic program consists of trade liberalization and financial liberalization. See BULMER-
THOMAS, supra note 51, at 10, 53,76,371.
71. See SKIDMORE & SMITH supra note 31, at 103-06, 179-82.
72. See BULMER-THOMAS supra note 51, at 369-77.
73. See Griffith-Jones, supra note 68, at 129-32.
74. D. Arner, The Mexican Peso Devaluation Crisis, NAFTA L. REV., Winter 1996.
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age of loans and guarantees to stabilize the currency. This bailout eased the crisis and
brought stability, but the need for the bailout had significant implications beyond Mexico.
These implicatons were nicknamed the "tequila effect."
The peso devaluation meant that investors in the capital markets not only retreated
from Mexico, but also, to a more limited extent, from elsewhere in Latin America. But the
Mexican crisis did not become a Latin American collapse. Indeed, the United States' reac-
tion contained the crisis, and Latin American economies continued to move along and be
judged by investors in the market on a country by country, sector by sector basis.
However, short term results were severe. Argentina, for example, briefly lost a greater per-
centage of deposits in its domestic banking system than the United States did during the
Great Depression of the 1930s. But, the Cavallo Plan to peg the peso to the dollar, along
with tight money, helped stem the tide of domestic liquidity and Argentina sufficiently
restored its finances to resume a stronger current account balance with which it could pay
off creditors in dollars. Foreign investment, therefore, has generally boomed in the most
recent period not only to Argentina but also to other national economies demonstrating
policymaking trends toward stability and efficiency in politics, trade, and the capital mar-
kets while Brazil was also affected, the effect was more limited because even though it had
its own set of currency problems relating to control of inflation, it had a unique set of sta-
bilization and monetary plans in place to raise and maintain the value of its currency.
The above general themes apply to two major MERCOSUR countries, Argentina and
Brazil, which were previewed in this section and are encapsulated below. Uruguay and Chile
also follow the same general pattern. 75 Paraguay, on the other hand, has a unique history
and pattern of development Nevertheless, it is characterized by many of the same themes,
including a recent return from military government to new, although fragile, liberal policies.
Historians have typically characterized Paraguay as a nation of strong men. Although
Argentina and many other nations have had their caudillos or "the man on horseback" step
in to play unifying roles, in Paraguay, such figures are even more prevalent. This is the fun-
damental political distinction between Paraguay and other MERCOSUR member states;
Paraguay's Conservative-Liberal rivalry in political parties is more than a century old. One
example of the strong man tradition is the conservative "democratic" rulle of Paraguay by
General Alfredo Stroessner from 1954 - 1989.76 Strongly emphasizing the development of
the agriculture and forestry industry, Stroessner remained in power until he was overthrown
by General Andres Rodriguez. General Rodriguez instituted liberal reforms and was fol-
lowed by democratically elected Juan Carlos Wasnoy. Political and economic liberalization
continued and a 1996 military coup attempt was undertaken, but squelched.77
75. See THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, (Simon Collier et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1992).
76. Id. at 278-79.
77. Id. at 277-78. See EP President Haensch Condemns Coup Attempt in Paraguay, REUTERS
NEWSMEDIA, Apr. 24, 1996.
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C. KEY SIMILARITIES IN THE ARGENTINE AND BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE.
Despite Brazil's greater geographical size, Argentina's greater citizen education level,
and distinctions between Brazil's Portuguese and Argentina's Spanish colonial origins,
both of these Latin economic powers are remarkably similar in many respects. Both
nations have experienced a history of export - orientation, populist "corporatism", ISI
experimentation, military in politics (as a moderator), and oscillations between liberalism
and state intervention as a means to stimulate economic development.
• Brazil's economy during the First Republic (1889-1930) was dominated by the alliance
of coffee, large landowners, and foreign 78 ideas and capital.79 The rise of Getulio Vargas in
a 1930 military coup saw a return to the neo colonial pattern of state intervention found
throughout Latin America.8 0 Nationalization of business was the order of the day through
the establishment of a corporatist style of governance. Under this model, business and the
state would work together to promote industry. This approach lasted until Vargas was
overthrown in 1945 and a brief flirtation with liberalization re-emerged.81
Vargas's return to power in 1950 signaled a return to state intervention in the econo-
my generally. Nationalization of key industries figured prominently in his plans.82 But a
1964 military coup saw a return to economic liberalism, even though such policies soon
fell out of favor. In the next decade, more state enterprises were created than any previous
era.83 Military rule ended in 1985, and President Jos6 Sarney, through Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, have, in varying degrees, pursued increased liberalization in the trade and finan-
cial dimension. 84
The inability of Brazilian creditors to pay debt and the rise of inflation to stratospher-
ic levels proved major obstacles to economic stability. As a result, the IMF prescribed, and
Brazil adopted, repeated stabilization and various liberalization programs to pull Brazil
out of its trough. 85 The hallmark of Brazil's recent stabilization efforts is President
Cardoso's "Piano Real", formulated when he was finance minister and implemented since
July 1994.86 The objective of the plan is to keep foreign investment flowing and the econo-
my consistently surging through a variety of tools to fight inflation by keeping the
Brazilian currency dose to its American counterpart. The result has been a drop in infla-
tion from a 640 percent annual rate to between 12-18 percent.87 Despite this impressive
achievement, some concern exists with another aspect of the Plano Real, tight monetary
78. Id.
79. Probably the best book on this period, although it focuses on the development of British ties with
Brazil, is RICHARD GRAHAM, BRITAIN AND THE ONSET OF MODERNIZATION 1850-1914 (1968).
80. See THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, POLITICS IN BRAZIL, 1930-1964: AN EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY (1967).
See also BURNS, supra note 47, at 346-47.
81. See generally id.
82. See also THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, THE POLITICS OF MILITARY RULE IN BRAZIL, 1964-1985 (1988).
83. See SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 31, at 182-84.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See SALOMON BROTHERS, EMERGING MARKET DEBT STRATEGY AND CURRENCY RECOMMENDATIONS
(1997).
87. See SKIDMORE & SMITH supra note 31, at 88-92. See also PETER H. SMITH, POLmCS AND BEEF IN
ARGENTINA: PATTERNS OF CONFLICT AND CHANGE (1969); D. ROCK, ARGENTINA 1516-1987: A STUDY
IN CONTRASTS 263 (1987).
68 NAFTA. Law and Business Review of the Americas
policy and loose fiscal policy. This concern uncovers Brazil's ability (or inability) to repay
its foreign obligations due to its large current account deficit. This concern is counterbal-
anced by the strong overall growth in trade, the record $8 billion in foreign direct invest-
ment, and the fact that Brazil's inflow of foreign money currently helps provide adequate
reserves for its current account deficit.
Argentina has also oscillated from conservative state intervention to liberalism in
much the same way. The late 19th century to 1930s was marked by a liberal regime where-
by foreign investors and domestic landowners controlled a disproportionate degree of
wealth. Juan Peron became President in 1946 on a nationalist and populist theme chal-
lenging this concentration of wealth and alliance of power.8 8 In response, an experiment
in corporatism and state intervention, with five year economic plans, was implemented. 89
A key component of this idea was an alliance between the military and labor. Peron's
new corporatist vision of a state mediating conflicts between functional groups of workers,
industrialists, and farmers was created in addition to a nationalization program. This was
followed by various swings back and forth from liberalization to state intervention. A
reaction to Peronism in the 1970s and 1980s saw the generally economically liberal mili-
tary leadership rise and fall.90 In the 1990s, the military left power and President Carlos
Menem was elected to power. 91
A resurgence of liberalization, including privatization, and a massive opening up of
the financial system to dollar-denominated deposits then took place. The drive toward
accumulating dollar deposits occurred to peg an Argentine peso pegged with dollar
reserves. Argentina succeeded in its economic stabilization effort, bringing inflation from
triple digits down to under 4 percent.92 This does not mean, of course, that stabilization
has not been bought at a price. After an easy period of growth due to the inflow of foreign
private money, reduction of the state sector and other problems have led to high levels of
unemployment.
D. POST WORLD WAR II: HEMISPHERIC, REGIONAL, AND SUBREGIONAL
INTEGRATION SCHEMES.
Throughout the post World War II period, Brazil and Argentina forged various bilat-
eral links of integration. They also participated in the United Nations-based Economic
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), which proposed subregional integration in
1949.93 This led directly to the formation of the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA) in 196094 Eleven countries, including Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico coordinated
economic integration through this scheme. The basic idea of LAFTA was a customs union
whereby tariffs on products would be reduced in successive rounds of negotiation over a
88. SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 31, at 87.
89. Id. at 93-96.
90. Id. at 100-106.
91. Id. at 106-112; Fernandez, supra note 68, at 107-108.
92. See, e.g., B. M. CARL, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS A MODEL FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS: TRADE
AND BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS (1986).
93. J.M. VECHINO, INTEGRACION LATINO AMERICANA: FROM ALAALc To ALADI (1983).
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12 year period. 95 Unfortunately for the member states, this idea broke down. Easy con-
cessions were achieved in the first few rounds and triumph hailed. Hard bargaining, how-
ever, followed this phase. Reconciling the differing objectives of many diverse Latin
American states was difficult and LAFTAs ability to cohesively promote economic integra-
tion stalled. Indeed, the last two scheduled rounds of negotiation were not held. Weaker
states were concerned that the stronger states of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico had too
much economic bargaining power.96 The final result was no gain in trade between the
LAFTA member states. Indeed some commentators perceive that LAFTA was basically a
vehicle for internal ISI growth which weakened Latin America's trade prospects through
protectionism, which in turn limited true export growth outside the continent for manu-
factured products. The formation of a successor entity, the Latin American Integration
Association (LAIA), followed next, in 1980.97
The Treaty of Montevideo, which created the LAIA, became the foundation for a
process which slowly, but successfully, achieved a limited number of tariff concessions
among its members. 98 Under this framework, member states retained the flexibility to
form bilateral links through treaties. These linkages were treaties of partial scope in which
the benefits an LAIA member granted to a third party through individual bilateral deals
were also granted to other LAIA members. This is known as a most favored nations clause.
A related development was the formulation of rules of origin. Through this device, LAIA
member states were classified into groups depending on their gross domestic product.
Those countries who were less developed needed a smaller percentage of their products
produced in their country to qualify for preferential treatment in the LAIA system, vis a vis
products from the outside.
The period during the 1980s, the diplomatic, political, regional organization, the
Organization of American States (OAS), chose to focus on harmonization of private law
and issues, rather than directly grapple with regional economic integration.99 The OAS
silence was not, however, of the deafening kind. Integration was merely a low priority for
members struggling with transitions to democracy and debt reduction. But with President
Bush's announcement of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), the OAS re
emerged as one catalyst for change in this area. 1 0
In President Bush's 1989 speech announcing the EAI, the United States stated that it
was committing itself to a new era where investment replaced debt, trade was liberalized,
and hemispheric integration via the completion of a free trade area by the year 2005 would
be achieved. 10 1 This announcement signaled a departure from the United States' passivity
to its direct engagement in economic integration. One byproduct of the EAI, which led to
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meaningful regional integration, was the eventual signing of a variety of bilateral trade
deals in Latin America, including the 1991 Rose Garden or 4+1 agreement structure,
whereby free trade agreements (FTA) could be realized with the United States through a
series of FTAs in Latin America and NAFTA. The EAI policy, and its successors, reversed a
decade of United States' reticence in Latin American hemispheric economic integration
and laid the groundwork for regional pacts.
Previously, a variety of efforts at another level, subregional integration between Latin
states, had surfaced and then submerged again in the 1960s and 1970s.102 In general, com-
mentators suggested that nationalism, protectionism, and difficulty in coordinating vari-
ous regimes of varying sophistication and size barred progress. Moreover, narrow, articu-
lated interests expressed concern loudly and effectively over the possibility that the United
States dominate the newly integrated market. Proponents of state interventionism and its
close correlate, nationalism, dominated the political economic landscape. Nationalism
and conservatism therefore became insuperable barriers to the formation and mainte-
nance of meaningful regional integration.
During the period up to 1986, national decisionmakers in Argentina and Brazil also
considered the prospects for integration between them and classified it a peripheral issue.
Instead, national decision makers focused on implementing "structural" reform pursuant
to ISI driven policies, and later responding to the external debt crisis with IMF driven sta-
bilization.
That subregional or even bilateral integration was low on each country's economic
priority list is not surprising; most existing foreign trade was beyond the continent.
Moreover, those subregional integration schemes which did manage to get off the ground
were likewise creatures of the state intervention anti-foreign bias of most Latin American
governments. The Latin American models which existed, such as the Andean Pact, were
not viewed as success stories in attracting and retaining foreign investment. Indeed, MER-
COSUR is so different than the Andean Pact that it may well have served as a model for
what to avoid in considering regional integration.
The Andean Pact established in 1966, was set up as a centrally planned economy inte-
gration model.1 03 Its goal was to form a subregional common market among Chile,
Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru, minimize the power of multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs), and provide special privileges to member states in the region. The Andean
Pact failed to produce substantive economic benefits for a variety of reasons. First, its
markets were too small. Ineffective state intervention supporting ISI needed large markets
to produce economies of scale to reduce production costs and be competitive. Primary
product export markets were also small. Likewise, controlling MNCs, while politically
popular, meant that restrictive clauses in the law limited or wiped out MNCs control, and
this further limited the ability104 of the Andean Pact to attract foreign technology and
102. O'Hop, supra note 17, at 138-39. For example, Carifta and Caricom were set up for the Caribbean
Area.
103. The Bogota Declaration was the basis for the establishment of the Andean Pact, although it was
not the Treaty itself. See INTERAM. INST. OF INT'L. LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS OF EcoNoMic
INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA.
104. THE CARIBBEAN 3 (1975). The respective treaties are the Agreement Establishing the Andean
Development Corporation, Feb. 7, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 940; Agreement on Andean Subregional
Integration, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910.
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investment - without any domestic technological or savings base to supplant it.
By 1976, the Andean Pact was unraveling. 10 5 First, a liberalizing Chile dropped
out.106 Second, disputes were starting to break out over interpretations of Andean law.
The underlying problem was that law was not uniformly recognized as supreme in nation-
al courts. Thus, the limited protections which investors had in Andean law were vitiated in
national courts. The solution was the establishment of a body of supranational law or
some other measure to reduce uncertainty. Such reform was forthcoming by 1979, but it
was too little, too late. A fractious Andean Pact continued to suffer further declines in for-
eign investment. 107
Since 1989, however, the Andean Pact became increasingly liberalized, with a repeal of
draconian constraints on foreign investment law and most recently, cuts in external
tariffs.108 This illustrates along with the confluence of U.S., as well as Brazil and Argentine
initiatives, a growing consensus toward greater integration.
In fact, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a sea change in the perception of the impor-
tance of integration at various levels, as well as the various types of liberalization took
place. The confluence of these international and regional factors contributed substantially
to the early talks between Brazil and Argentina in 1986, and beyond, which laid the
groundwork for the establishment of MERCOSUR. 10 9 A key factor, in addition to the
above U.S. EAI initiative, was that trading blocs consisting of the United States, Japan, and
the E.U. were emerging as geographic regional cores. Absent a strong inelastic demand
product base, various efforts at South-South integration had generally failed to achieve the
aspirations of their members. Further, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT) system was generally attuned to reducing barriers for industrial goods." 0 This
achievement took place in a series of tariff reduction rounds since the 1960s for member
states. Members included nearly all the world's economies so that participation in the
GATT was essential to gain entry into most markets on nondiscriminatory terms. GATT
did not address, however, the primary export products of Latin America in agriculture -
and these products were highly protected world wide.I11 But it did provide some working
global legal and economic framework from which countries could seek to promote indus-
trial, agricultural, and services market niches where they could best sell their products.
105. Id.
106. O'Hop, supra note 17, at 142.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See also E.J. Cardenas, The Regional Approach to Hemispheric Integration: A Modular Approach
Towards Free Trade, 1 Sw.J.L. & TRADE AM. 49 (1994).
110. Id. at 51.
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E. THE REGIONALIZATION OF WORLD ECONOMIES AS ADDITIONAL IMPETUS TO
LIBERAL REFORM AND POTENTIAL EMERGING OBSTACLE.
In this environment of global integration, Argentina and Brazil took the lead to forge
links with each other and form the MERCOSUR Common Market. Although a diplomat-
ic history of how the MERCOSUR agreement came about is yet to be written, recognition
of a more integrated world economy within designated geographic groups must have
influenced Brazil and Argentina to follow suit in the Southern cone. Additionally, both
countries began looking to each other as partners and concretized 24 different protocols of
economic cooperation in the 1980s toward this end. Consequently, it was not surprising
that as the global trading market became more difficult to penetrate for these debt-ridden
states, they sought to stengthen economic linkages with each other. In their negotiations,
both countries swayed to the familiar dance of integration, namely a search for expanding
market access while protecting selected goods. This logic helped propel the already liberal-
oriented governments of Argentina and Brazil toward seeking greater export-led growth
and revitalized development through reduction of tariffs and greater access to the market
of their neighbors.
This liberal model, in marked contrast to centrally planned integration models like
the Andean Pact for the Northern part of Latin America and the loose confederation of the
LAIA, well reflects the primacy of the NEM/Washington Consensus during the most
recent decade. In this climate of emergent regionalization of trade and domestic financial
crisis in a global setting, MERCOSUR started to take root.
Nonetheless, it cannot be ignored that a significant school of thought believes that the
regionalization of world economies has started to lead to a variety of protectionist
"fortresses" of trade. Such configurations, it is argued, are not working to create more
trade through the early efforts of liberalization. Rather, these efforts are breaking down
the global trading system through the erection of regional blocs who attempt to use their
bargaining power to engage in domestic protectionism against the rest of the world.
Whether this argument appears to have merit in the context of MERCOSUR's current
expansion alternatives is amplified in Part VI.
F. THE RELEVANCE OF MERCOSUR.
History is oblique coming in from the side. Accordingly, the narrative synthesis pro-
vided is only moderately useful in preparing decisionmakers for the challenges which will
likely surface. Nevertheless, an appreciation of this background can inform current think-
ing about MERCOSUR by forewarning of past dangers to economic integration and to a
long life span for liberalization. Thus informed, social analysts can draw their own conclu-
sions about how the sui generis facts of the moment are linked to the antecedents of the
past. And decisionmakers can analyze and help guide MERCOSUR along a path which
alleviates historical tensions.
Certain tentative "lessons" can be drawn from the above history, namely that some
type of crude liberal-conservative cycles appear to exist and that increased protectionism
results, or at least coincide sometimes, with the conservative part of the cycle. These fun-
damental challenges constitute the fabric of historical barriers and tensions and must be
resolved. Therefore, the next step is determining how MERCOSUR can alleviate the effects
Summer 1997 73
of these historic themes. The answer to that problem lies inevitably in an ongoing process
of social, legal, and economic reform. Law has a central role to play in this process,
through MERCOSUR, by providing a means to transform or at least modify economic and
social behavior. These steps are as follows. First, MERCOSUR can provide legal rules
which can help move the overall process of legal reform forward. This includes the cur-
rent, carefully balanced linear path toward greater liberalization, as well as a potential
moderating role for MERCOSUR vis-A-vis nationalism and the creation of a more harmo-
nized legal regime. Second, MERCOSUR must provide institutions which have the means
to advance such ends. In this regard, a dispute resolution mechanism which is certain, sta-
ble, and predictable is important for attracting foreign investment and preventing nation-
alistic tensions between member states. Moreover, this framework should help attract for-
eign investment and stimulate trade. Third, expansion of MERCOSUR to the North must
factor in concerns about dependency and the deep-rootedness of related concerns about
encroachments on national sovereignty by foreigners. Although none of these elements
guarantee economic growth and development, proper policy making can mitigate social
tensions which develop when state engages in protectionism, which diverts more trade
than it creates.
As the above section shows, the Latin American economy, with its typically export-ori-
ented foundation, has oscillated from a stop and go pattern of conservatism to liberalism.
The focus of Part III is how the legal framework of MERCOSUR fits within this context.
III. Legal Rulemaking Dimension and the Unification and
Harmonization of Law.
A. LEvELs OF ANALYSIS AND LEGAL SOURCES.
In order to understand how MERCOSUR operates, the starting point is asking how
the legal framework works. Next, the key questions are what are the objectives of the legal
rules, what do these rules say, and how is the development of a body of law through MER-
COSUR progressing. Each question is examined in turn.
A regional integration scheme such as MERCOSUR consists of law at treaty level,
national law, and public international law. The highest level of law is the original or treaty
law. In MERCOSUR, debate arises as to the original source document because MERCO-
SUR is a member of the LAIA as well as a separate entity. Some commentators identify the
key relevant documents as the 1986 Buenos Aires Act to integrate Argentina and Brazil, as
well as the guidelines contained in the LAIA, December 1990, Economic
Complementation Accord No. 14 (ACE No. 14).112 Still others trace the origins of MER-
COSUR and relevant treaty law to the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo because of its role as the
original framework document for the LAIA. 113
112. To compare varying perspectives as to the effect of the Buenos Aires Act and ACE No.18, see
EKMEKDJIAN, supra note 22, at 147-82, 261, and O'Keefe, supra note 5, at 439-41. See also C.E.
Colauti, El Tratado del Mercado Comun del Sur: Respuestas e Interrogantes, REv. JcA. ORG. LA LEY
(1993-D).
113. Id.
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Regardless of which document is perceived as the true formulation for MERCOSUR,
it is nevertheless dear that ACE No. 14, which was signed by the four original signatories,
is part of MERCOSUR law. Indeed, the LAIA and MERCOSUR are, in certain respects,
parallel organizations. MERCOSUR's key provisions are set out in the Treaty of Asuncion
and this Treaty is incorporated by reference in ACE No. 18, following the ratification of the
Treaty by the four signatories' legislatures. 114 The treaty is virtually substantively identical
to ACE No. 18.115 A significant distinction from the earlier ACE No. 14 is that ACE No. 18
contains the parties' agreement to establish the decision making bodies and other institu-
tions of MERCOSUR administration.
The legal sources at the community or MERCOSUR level are carried forward in various
protocols through the exercise of signatories, based on the Treaty of Asuncion's constitutional
powers to engage in further agreements. 116 These legal sources are administered by MERCO-
SUR legal institutions. These institutions have international legal personality. Member states
who have signed the above various documents are therefore acknowledging them as sovereign
obligations which they are obligated to respect. Law, at this level, may next be classified with
respect to the extent that member states have certain commitments to abide by the provisions
in an express or implied manner, depending on the text of the particular provision. Likewise,
the law may contain a permissive or mandatory text depending upon the the terms of the text
itself (for example, 'shall' as opposed to 'may'), interaction between the text and custom of the
particular law or regulation in MERCOSUR (for example, developing norms of MERCOSUR
law), and the particular national legal regime (contolling, providing guidance, or subordi-
nate). The extent to which member states are bound to abide by the provisions of the Treaty
and its' successor legal sources can therefore be a complex and evolving process, despite the
seeming presence of "black letter" provisions which appear to present cert ain legal conclusions
in a virgin legal fora. This issue is made more complex and important by the fact that no
supranational judicial authority exists to enforce the legal status of MERCOSUR law.
Moreover, the status of MERCOSUR law varies within each state, raising the possibility of
more uncertainty in legal dispute resolution.
The Protocol of Ouro Preto (OPP) states that the legal sources of MERCOSUR are the
Treaty of Asuncion, its' Protocols, and additional or supplementary instruments, agreements
concluded within the Treaty framework and its protocols, and decisions of various bodies of
MERCOSUR since the entry into force of the Treaty of Asuncion. 117 This level of law for the
decision making bodies of MERCOSUR is derivative of the original power. It includes deci-
sions of the Common Market Council (Council), resolutions of the Common Market Group
(Group) and directives of the MERCOSUR Trade Commission (Commission). Importantly,
Article 42 sets forth that the above MERCOSUR organ's decisions "shall be binding and,
when necessary, must be incorporated in the domestic legal systems in accordance with the
procedures provided for in each country's legislation " (e.s.). 118
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of MERCOSUR
("Protocol of Ouro Preto"), Dec. 17, 1994, Arg.-Braz. Para.-Uru., art. 41-42,34 I.L.M. 1244 [here-
inafter OPP].
117. Id. at art. 42.
118. Id. at art. 7.
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A review of the above indicates that the derivative law of MERCOSUR is intended to
have mandatory application in domestic legal systems. However, this does not mean that
such law is necessarily supreme to that of other domestic laws. Internal conflicts of law
rules would then come into place to determine how to resolve this dilemma.
Substantively speaking, the Council, as the legal personality of MERCOSUR and its
highest organ, issues decisions, which are internal to the MERCOSUR states, and signs
agreements on behalf of MERCOSUR with third parties, such as foreign governments.
The Group can issue binding resolutions and various working sub-groups can also make
recommendations. 119 A provision also exists for sectoral agreements in which business
persons from each of the member states convene to engage in discussions about facilitating
development of complementary (or competing) economic products in their respective
industrial sectors. Such meetings and accords are implemented to take advantage of each
country's economic strengths and to advance technology transfer and form larger, better
markets. 12 0 This provision is contained in the LAIA arrangements. 12 1
National or domestic law follows in the classification scheme. Although such law is
technically not a part of MERCOSUR law, in the sense that it is incorporated in the MER-
COSUR Treaty(s), awareness of the member states' laws is critical to analyze the effect
which MERCOSUR law can have on MERCOSUR's web of economic laws and regulations.
On a practical level, domestic legal systems can further implementation of liberalization or
make it more difficult, if not impossible. This is true even if no direct conflict takes place.
For example, in a customs harmonization matter, a related revenue provision makes a
customs provision, which intends to streamline border procedures, impossible to imple-
ment.122 Moreover, an exception in a commercial piece of domestic legislation, which is
seemingly intended to apply to a national issue area, impacts MERCOSUR as well thus
making the same hypothetical customs provision's streamlining goal impossible to achieve.
Such legal development, while technically not inconsistent, can stymie harmonization pro-
foundly even though it is indirect. Therefore, analysis of complex specific national laws is
an integral building block element of harmonization on an issue by issue basis.
With respect to public and private national law, various harmonization efforts have
already been undertaken by MERCOSUR member states on a regional level as to broader
Latin American issues.123 On the private law level, the OAS has for many years convened
an Inter-American judicial committee (IAJC) which has been conducting the Inter-
American specialised conferences on private international law (CIDIPs). 124 Five CIDIPs
have taken place since 1975, with the focus on conflicts of law and judicial cooperation. 125
On the other hand, Latin American states have been reluctant to join certain international
119. Id. at art. 9-14.
120. Id. at art. 5d. Practical examples of areas in which such efforts exist are services, transport, com-
munication, and agriculture. <http:ll www.invertir.com>.
121. See the discussion of this issue in EKMEKDJIAN, supra note 22 at 92-100; cf. OPP, supra note 116, at
art. 5d.
122. An extensive customs code, protocol, and lists of procedures exist in law to reduce customs prob-
lems. <http:l www.embassy.org/uraguay/econ/MERCOSUR>.
123. See Garro, supra note 24, at 589-601. See also D. HARGAIN, G. MIHALI, REGIMEN JURIDICO DE
CONTRATACION MERCANTIL INTERNACIONAL EN EL MERCOSUR (1993).
124. Garro, supra note 24, at 591.
125. O'Hop, supra note 17, at 164-65.
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conventions, such as certain Hague Conferences on private international law and Unidroit,
because of a preference for a regional approach. 126 Accordingly, the past record shows sig-
nificant hemispheric wide efforts have been undertaken to harmonize and unify private
law in domestic states and on an international level, to resolve interstate private law con-
flict. This is a particularly salient area of legal development since commercial disputants
desire certainty and stability in law, and such harmonization is helpful in reducing con-
flicts between individual parties in states.
Current efforts toward harmonization of law within MERCOSUR have begun logical-
ly with the individual states' initiatives in the institutional framework of MERCOSUR and
the below described relevant efforts at the national level. For the MERCOSUR law itself,
the legal sources are the decision frameworks of the Group and Council as well as any
other entities such as the JPC, which is to consider harmonization and specially appointed
MERCOSUR ad hoc groups. The effect of such MERCOSUR law depends upon the legal
regime in each member state, specifically, the extent of authority which MERCOSUR has
in the relevant national hierarchy of law. This in turn depends on the legal structure of the
particualar regime.
As to the national laws themselves, five different legal groupings exist in Latin
America. 127 Countries such as Chile and Argentina are heavily influenced by the French
civil code but have adopted original devices.128 Uruguay's legal structure resembles that of
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile because of the above historical influences. 129 Brazil's law,
however, reflects codes that arose in the early twentieth century and represent a different
private law tradition.130
Nevertheless, all of the member states have civil law traditions. However, this is not to
mimimize the variety of constitutional structures that exist as well as the idiosyncratic cul-
tural norms that have arisen to help the lawyer determine how the law is actually applied
in different national contexts. Accordingly, it appears that at the broadest level, significant
distinctions exist between the various groupings. Convergence of law is therefore more
readily directed toward specific issue area reforms.
Despite whatever differences may exist in styles of rulemaking, the core of economic
and financial regulation sheds light on the making of directives at the broader MERCO-
SUR level in order to transcend the boundaries which exist between nations. Such work
has been slow to commence, but slow change has occurred in certain critical issue areas,
such as customs harmonization since the most recent Fortaleza Summit. 131 The final level
of analysis is the public international law dimension. The Ouro Preto Protocol states that
MERCOSUR has international legal personality. Whether this transforms MERCOSUR
into an organ of supranational authority is discussed in Part IV(D).
126. Id. See also Garro, supra note 24, at 594-95 n.38.
127. Garro, supra note 23, at 606-07.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. OPP, supra note 116, at art. 34.
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B. ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES.
A review of the terms of MERCOSUR show that it is essentially a customs union with
a CET rather than a more basic free trade area or a more advanced common market eco-
nomic union with total economic integration.132
The dimensions of economic integration must be defined because this provides a
working definiton of MERCOSUR itself, as well a base of comparison with other entities
such as NAFTA. A free trade area is the most primitive form of integration. This consists
of an entity which removes tariff and quota type restrictions on goods among the member
states. 133 A customs union consists of a free trade area with a CET. 134 A common market
combines these factors, plus the free movement of goods and the free movement of ser-
vices, labor, and capital.135 An economic union also harmonizes macro-economic poli-
cies. 136 Total economic integration is similar to federal, state, or community relationships
in that each of the relevant states retain certain powers while overarching economic and
social policies, affecting the entity as a whole, reside in a binding, decision-making body
with supranational authority.137
C. CoRE TREATY RULES.
Annex I to the Treaty contemplated duty free trade among MERCOSUR member
states by the close of 1995.138 The four Presidents' agreement superceded Annex 1 stating
that implementation of a free trade area was delayed until 1999 for Argentina and Brazil,
and the year 2000 for Paraguay and Uruguay.139 In the earliest stages, an extensive list of
products exempt from MERCOSUR's tariff reduction schedule was drawn through the
"transitional phase" to January 1, 1995.140 Exemptions for the post-1995 post-transitional
"interim" phase were also drawn up and have been further reduced. 141 The overwhelming
131. Geoff Dyer, MERCOSUR Nations Drive Ahead Through Some Tricky Terrain, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 28,
1996. See also R.R. RUA Boiero, MERCOSUR: La Forteleza de la Cumbre de Forteleza (Segunda
Parte), PEuODIcO ECONOMICO TRIBUrARIo-EDIc. LA LEY, Mar. 3, 1997.
132. See O'Keefe, supra note 5, at 1-3.





138. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 3, at Annex I.
139. See O'Keefe, supra note 5, at 3.
140. Id. This includes 950 items for Uruguay, 427 for Paraguay, 221 for Argentina, and 29 for Brazil.
The goal is obviously zero by the year 2000 (1995 for Brazil and Argentina). Autos and sugar are
excluded. Id.
141. Id. The post January 1995 period reflects 11 CET levels from 0-20% with 300 initial exemptions
(399) for Paraguay whittled down through 2001 (and 2006 for Paraguay). Two other groups subject to special arrangements are capital goods tariff convergence by 2001 at 14%, and informatics
and telecoms to 165 by 2006. Brazil had temporarily been allowed to raise tariffs on 150 goods in
1996, with 50 exemptions for Argentina and the other countries allowed as a special concession.
This has changed in that Brazil, during the course of the year, reduced their exemption to 68.
Trade Policy: Brazil Announces Plans to Reduce Products Exempt from MERCOSUR, 13 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 721 (May 1, 1996).
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majority of goods currently do not contain any tariffs with certain notable exemptions in
capital goods (for example, information and telecommunications equipment). 142
Annex I of the Treaty provides for the rules of origin provision of the agreement. The
rules of origin can determine who is entitled to receive preferential treatment under
MERCOSUR's tariffs. 143 The essential test is whether a good is either native or sufficiently
transformed within the region so as to be characterised as a new "local" product under the
pre-existing LAIA classification system. 144 One of the numerous constraints set forth
states that more assembly will not qualify a product for local preferential treatment. 145
Rules of origin apply to those products which are exemptions to the CET because they are
deemed by national authorities to require special protection. Those rules are still in exis-
tence for the limited number of products which are still exempt.' 46
Annex IV provides safeguard clauses up to December 31, 1994.147 This clause pro-
vides a member country with the capability to impose a numerical quota on goods from
another MERCOSUR country if a sudden rise in imports substantially harms or threatens
to harm the country's economy and it can prove that such rise is due to subsidized exports
or dumping. 148 This type of clause has been extended and is intended to ensure that the
regional market is fair and that national governments do not bow to powerful domestic
industrialists seeking special privileges, i.e. protection from competition. 149 These sub-
stantive rules are still in place and are the subject of continuing reform along with a full set
of harmonized competition rules to be implemented by the year 2005.150
Article 5(d) of the Treaty lays out provisions for sectoral complementation of goods.
Under these provisions, which have included at least one major sector (steel), the goal is
for similar industries to work together to become competitive on the international
market.15' Subsequent agreements, such as the Protocol of Colonia, have conversely iden-
tified various sensitive sectors, such as telecommunications or financial services, which are
off-limits to foreign investors or highly regulated.' 52
142. O'Keefe, supra note 5, at 5-6.
143. Id. No more than 50% of a finished good's Free on Board (FOB) value does not reflect the cost,
insurance, freight (CIF) price of extra regional components so that the good will be entitled to
extra-preferential treatment. Id.
144. Id. at 26-27.
145. Id.
146. Reid, supra note 6, at 5.
147. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 3, at Annex X.
148. Id. These safeguard clauses have recently been updated and will undergo further change with a
full scheme of implementation and accompanying competition rules by the year 2001. See R.R.
RUA Boiero, MERCOSUR: La Forteleza Argentina en Forteleza, PERIODICO EcONOMICO TRIBUTARIO
LA LEY, Dec. 30, 1996; Boiero, supra note 130.
149. Reuter Textline, Dec. 9, 1995.
150. See Dyer, supra note 30; Boiero, supra note 131, at 144.
151. Id. See also H. Berkemeyer, El Mercado Comun y el Derecho de la Competencia, LA LEY (1993-D).
152. Protocolo de Colonia, in, MERCOSUL NO CoNTExTo LATINO-AMERICANO 115-121 (Marcos Simao
Figueiras ed., 1994).
Summer 1997 79
The telecommunications sector has recently been deregulated in Brazil so that privati-
zation can begin there.15 3 Argentina has also deregulated the telecommunications indus-
try and along with all participating MERCOSUR countries, the recent worldwide WTO
accord will open up the market to foreign investors in this sector in the next few years.15 4
Finally, article 7 of the Treaty provides that goods of one MERCOSUR country are
entitled to the same internal duty or tax treatment as internal goods. The elimination of
tax obstacles to cross border transactions, including double taxation treaties, is essential to
facilitating the flow of investment.
As previously discussed, the legal structure of MERCOSUR contains various organs,
which have different decision-malking capabilities. Moreover, the Brasilia Protocol and the
Ouro Preto Protocol establish dispute settlement rules and a dispute settlement mecha-
nism. These respective institutional innovations are discussed in the next part on the insti-
tution building aspect of the MERCOSUR project.
D. EFFECT ON DOMESTIC LAWS AND THE ISSUE OF SUPRANATIONAL AUTHORITY.
Three core questions arise with respect to MERCOSUR's effect on domestic law. First,
what is the direct effect of MERCOSUR law? Is such law supreme or subordinate in the
various member states? Second, what is the indirect effect of MERCOSUR law? Is it serv-
ing to assist in the liberalization program of domestic laws? Third, can legal unification
and harmonization of laws assist in alleviating the persistent tension between economic
conservatism and liberalism, or does it merely transfer the problems of member states to
another level? These questions will be discussed in turn.
To look at the direct effects of MERCOSUR law, the starting point is to return to the
provision contained in article 42 of the OPP. This provides that MERCOSUR law shall be
incorporated into each country's national law, where necessary, by the respective legisla-
ture.156 Two points arise. First, what happens if MERCOSUR law is not adopted as part
of domestic law? Second, when are circumstances 'necessary' to trigger a national legisla-
ture to engage in such a response? The OPP does not contain an enforcement mechanism
which makes a member state incorporate MERCOSUR law.157 Nevertheless, the Joint
Parliamentary Commission (JPC) exists, which is set up in the OPP to speed up entry into
force of the Article 2 organs' decisions by the respective national parliaments as well as
153. L. Trevisan (Visiting Fellow, Institute for Latin American Studies, University of London),
Privatization in Brazil (on file with author). See also Brazil Report, June 28, 1996 (discussion of
various directives needed to implement telecommunications reform); Pinhero Neto, Doing
Business in Brazi Jan. 1997. Brazil's telecoms sector will require $100 billion in new capital as it
undergoes privatization in the next five years for April 7 forward.
154. See Telecoms Survey, FIN. TIMES, March 1997. The overall market growth in a global scale is esti-
mated at $1 trillion in 10 years, due to liberalization. Argentina's two biggest telecoms duopoly,
Telecomm and Telefonica, have been provided special concessions by the Argentine government
in the last few years in exchange for heavy investment. Opening up telecoms is therefore not
expected soon but is still under consideration. Id.
155. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 3, at art.7.
156. OPP, supra note 116, at art. 42 (emphasis added).
157. It should be noted that OPP art. 38 indicates state parties are to take steps to ensure MERCOSUR
law is incorporated in state law. OPP, supra note 116, at art. 38.
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assist in the harmonization of laws relating to the integration process.1 58 Although this
process has limitations, it suggests that MERCOSUR is serious about advancing the legal
harmonization process, notwithstanding the existence of certain priority areas, such as
nontariff barriers, which continue to have significant unresolved problems.' 59
Moreover, even if harmonization were in fact proceeding more quickly, the place of
MERCOSUR law within a given national system varies and therefore imposes constraints
on achieving uniformity. Argentina, for example, currently accepts the idea of a suprana-
tional legal order.160 Chapter 4, article 75, section 24 of the Argentine Constitution pro-
vides regional integration law, such as MERCOSUR, with such status. 16 1 The 1988
Brazilian Constitution, article 4, contains a provision encouraging integration but other-
wise has no effect. 162
In light of the above level of effort and current set of legal constraints, some commen-
tators perceive broad unification and harmonization as far away on the horizon, if not
impossible. This perception seems accurate and is due perhaps to MERCOSUR's (1) focus
on establishment of the CET and free movement of goods over any of the other four initial
Treaty objectives, and (2) the allocation of institutional resources to crises in various areas,
such as resolving the dispute between Argentina and Brazil over automobile tariffs. 163
Moreover, the process of harmonization is slow. Also, efforts to achieve such law reform is
purposeful but slow, outside of reciprocal privileges for university degrees and licenses,
other educational related initiatives, and specialized areas which arise on an ad hoc basis at
ministerial meetings. 164
On the other hand, some indirect effects for 'spill-overs' of MERCOSUR rulemaking
and economic activity exist which are highly positive. Perhaps the clearest and most note-
worthy concurrent development has been the creation of'bi-national corporations'
between Argentina and Brazil. 165 These bi-national enterprises allow national treatment
158. OPP, supra note 116, at 25. art. 25.
159. See Reid, supra note 6, at 11-12. See also EKMEKDJIAN, supra note 22, at 269-73 (discussing the
pyramidical structure of BP, article 19 decision making). Ekmekdjian argued that MERCOSUR
law is not supranational and therefore is not properly included in the sources of law which can
serve to fill in the gaps for legal decisions. Whether this changed by the fact that the OPP provides
MERCOSUR with international legal personality is an interesting point of evolution. Moreover,
the author's emphasis on the legal infrastructure (e.g., the process) contained in the Treaty of
Asunci6n and the most important protocols is not to minimize other important achievements
such as acceptance of the Basle capital adequacy guidelines, limited harmonization of rules forjoint particiption in, for example, the Buenos Aires and Sao Paolo stock exchanges (with com-
mon rules for public offerings and mutual funds to be put in place throughout MERCOSUR in
the Protocoal of Colonia and succeeding working groups), and various other protocols on
defense of the consumer, fair competition, and false origin certification. Id.
160. See CONST. ARG. 75-24.
161. Id.
162. See Brazilian Federative Constitution, C.F. art. 4 (1994 revised ed.).
163. See generally Reid, supra note 6.
164. See O'Keefe, supra note 5, at 4.
165. See Raul A. Etcheverry, The MERCOSUR: Business Enterprise and Joint Ventures, 39 ST. LOuis, U.
L.J. 1979 (1995); M.C. Marsili, La Arrnonizacion de las Legislaciones Societaries de los Paises del
MERCOSUR, LA LEY 1994.
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for corporations and although development of this legislation is not directly tied to MER-
COSUR itself, it is obviously the product of the integration efforts of Argentina and Brazil
during the most recent period. 166
The next level of analysis is whether MERCOSUR law alleviates the persistent tension
between economic conservatism and liberalism. This question, at this stage of
MERCOSUR's growth, fundamentally relies on the realization of institutions which can,
over time, effectively carry out liberalization. Because this question is primarily related to
institution building, it is discussed in Part V (B).
E. PROSPECTS FOR UNIFICATION AND HARMONIZATION.
The prospects for broad unification of law within MERCOSUR seem far off. This
should hardly be a source of surprise. Each of the respective member states have a strong
national identity and a particular legal system which has evolved and undergone unique
historical development. Moreover, member states' laws are based on different origins. No
one model seems suitable, much less likely to gain universal acceptance from such diverse
neighbors. Nevertheless, the presence of MERCOSUR institutions, which legislate, exe-
cute, and resolve disputes according to a body of MERCOSUR law, means that some uni-
form laws are already part of the legal landscape. Therefore, uniformity on the national
level between member states awaits the work of law reformers seeking to achieve this
transaction cost reducing goal. But, achieving such selected unification of national law
does not seem insurmountable, because the technical committees of the Group, the Joint
Parliamentary Commission, and ad hoc working groups have been formulated to solve
particular problems.167
To the extent that there are differences in civil code language or Spanish and
Portuguese, which make selective unification problematic, harmonization of laws can be
attempted to reduce, if not eliminate, conflicts among states as to selected issues. The prob-
lem then is what issues should be highlighted for harmonization and what form should
they take. The problem is that determining priorities for harmonization is a long and diffi-
cult process. Review of the European Union's development in this area shows that the
process can take decades, rather than years to complete. 168 Therefore, it is much more logi-
cal to speak of an evolving process of harmonization and assessing whether such process
seems to be in place and functioning toward the realization of concrete goals. In this regard,
there is scant progress to report, with customs harmonization looming as the specific issue
area which is proving most troublesome. Nonetheless, the JPC's institutional structure at
least provides an institutional mechanism for harmonization. Further, the fact that MER-
166. See Etcheverry, supra note 165.
167. Id.
168. See e.g., P. Clarotti, The E. U. as a Model for Financial Market Reform, EMERGING FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1996). For the early history
and developments from the founding Treaty of Rome up to 1986, see EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY: TRADE AND INVESTMENT (Joseph J. Norton ed., 1986). However, some authors (actu-
ally the official Brazilian embassy web page) argue that the proper point of reference is the 1944
Benelux convention between Luxembourg and the Netherlands when a detailed comparison is
made of all the relevant elements. See generally Brazil Info/undres <http://
www.demon.co.uk/itamaraty> (the EEC and BENELUX models).
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COSUR has international legal personality should also assist in harmonization. These two
elements show that some foundation for substantial progress exists, regardless of whether
the lack of supranational authority means that MERCOSUR law is not the final determina-
tive source of law that some would like (e.g., the MERCOSUR "lacks teeth" perspective).
The core Treaty rules themselves do not appear to have any direct effect on unification
and harmonization, except to the extent that their broad economic purpose is liberaliza-
tion and this ties in with the objective of legal harmonization. Nevertheless, to the degree
that the Treaty's objectives are worked out steadily, it appears likely that the basic plan of
economic integration will extend itself into the achievement of further integration with
the other objectives of free movement of labor, capital, and services.
IV. The Institution Building Dimension.
A. MEMBERSHIP.
The Treaty, in article 20, provides that any LAIA member can become a member of
MERCOSUR. 169 Accesion to membership is a process requiring further negotiation as
Chile and Bolivia can certainly attest to with respect to their own initiations.
A state may terminate membership in MERCOSUR according to the provisions of
article 21 of the Treaty. 170 Two requirements exist. First, sixty days' notice must be pro-
vided to the remaining members. Second, states must adhere to the Treaty's trade liberal-
ization program for another two years after the withdrawal of the request becomes effec-
tive. 171 Interestingly, Brazil and Argentifia negotiated an escape clause for themselves in
ACE No. 14 allowing either of them to leave MERCOSUR if other member states, such as
Uruguay and Paraguay, vote some measure unfavorable to them in MERCOSUR itself.172
B. EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING STRUCTURE.
The decision-making process of MERCOSUR has solidified in the last five years and
grown in power. This sub-part reviews Treaty arrangements from the transitional phase to
the present.
Article 9 of the Treaty sets forth the Treaty's general institutional arrangements during
the transition period to December 31, 1994.173 Article 9 provides for two transitional
groups, the Common Market Council and the Common Market Group. 174
The Council is the highest level executive group, consisting of Foreign and Economic
169. See Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 3, art 20 for further details. Note that LAIA is sometimes
referred to by its Spanish acronym- ALADI. Id
170. Id. at art. 21.
171. Id. This reflects the closer working relationship which Brazil and Argentina already have and
appears to reflect their greater bargaining power as well.
172. Id. at art. 9.
173. Id.
174. Id. Cf. OPP, supra note 116, at art. 3-15.
175. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 3, at art. 10.
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ministries of the respective parties and concerned with Treaty compliance. 175 It is primar-
ily set up to engage in economic and foreign policy making so that MERCOSUR member
states can iron out differences and speak with one voice.
Next in the hierarchy is the Group, which is the top administrative agency charged
with implementing Council decisions and overall Treaty compliance. The Group consists
of four representatives from the Foreign Affairs, Economics or its equivalent ministry,
another relevant ministry, and the Central Bank for each member state. 176 It was initially
comprised of ten working sub-groups related to different policy areas. 177 Private sector
representatives are allowed to participate in official workgroup discussions related to spe-
cific issues of interest.178
Neither the transitional Council nor the Group had supranational authority.
Decisions made by either of these two bodies are reviewable and ultimately decided by
each member state's respective legislature. Under article 15 of the Treaty, an
Administrative Secretariat was created to handle such matters as meeting coordination and
press relations. 179
These transitional entities have become permanent and remain the same in most
respects. The major change is that the Group and Council's power has been enhanced
with the power to make binding decisions or resolutions. In addition, other ancillary sub-
groups have been set up. 180
The structure and functions of the core institutions remain the same in many key
respects. The OPP outlines these post transitional instititutions as the Council, Group,
and Administrative Secretariat.181 The Council remains the highest policy making organ
and its duties continue to focus on policy making duties and implementation as well as
ruling on proposals of the Group.182 The Group is still charged with monitoring compli-
ance with MERCOSUR's directives and rules, proposing changes and appointments to the
Council, and enforcing its own decisions. 183
One potentially important change is the power of the Group and the Council. Article
34 of the OPP states that MERCOSUR shall possess international legal personality.184
This means that when MERCOSUR speaks as a collective body through Council or Group
decisions, it speaks as the expression of members' international legal obligations to each
other and to others as a collective body. The role which such an international law obliga-
176. Id. at art. 10 & 14.
177. Id.
178. Id. at art. 14.
179. Id. at art. 15.
180. See generally, OPP supra note 116. The work subgroups perform tasks in two functional stages:
investigative and policy-making recommendations. These groups are formulated along specialized
lines: commercial, customs, technical standards, tax and monetary policy, land transport, sea trans-
port, industrial and technology, agriculture, energy, coordination of macroeconomic policy, and




183. OPP, supra note 116, at art. 14.
184. Id. at art. 34.
185. Id. at art. 15.
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tion plays in each country is to the constraints of national legislation, particular treaty
obligations, and the Constitution of member states.
Further, article 15 of the protocol states that the decisions of the group, as memorialized
by resolutions, are binding on members.1 85 However, no express enforcement provision
exists indicating what a state could do to ensure compliance with a resolution.
The MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat is the other remaining post-transitional
phase institution. 186 It remains essentially the same.1 87 The primary institutional innova-
tion in the post transitional era is the addition of the MERCOSUR Trade Commission
(Commission) whose decisions, as discussed below, are binding on state parties. 188 A Joint
Parliamentary Commission (JPC) and the Economic Social Consultative Forum (Forum)
have also been set up.189
The Commission is charged with assisting the Group in formulating its trade policies
by monitoring application of the policy, reviewing implementation of such policies, and
analyzing common trade policies, intra MERCOSUR trade and third country
concessions. 190 These include issues such as other trade agreements, rules of origin, free
trade zone, unfair trade practices, customs coordination and harmonization, consumer
protection, export incentive harmonization, and compliance concerns regarding common
offshore tariffs. 19 1 The Commission consists of four designated members of each state
party and is coordinated by the respective Foreign Affairs Minister.192 According to article
20, the Commission has the power through its decisions to make binding directives or
proposals. 193 No express enforcement provision exists here either. The Commission also
has the power to form technical committees to carry on its work. 194
The JPC can supply recommendations to the Council through the Group when assist-
ing in the harmonization of laws relating to the integration process. 195 Its 64 members, 16
per state, have a wide degree of responsibility.196 These functions include informing the
respective national congress of relevant matters, recommending action to the Group and
Council as to integration matters, and assisting in setting up a prospective MERCOSUR
parliament. 197 The JPC is also the principal body charged with harmonizing laws with dif-
ferent states, approving the MERCOSUR budget, and carrying on relationships with non-
member states as to technical assistance matters. 198 The Forum consists of members of
each state party199 and its purpose is to make recommendations to the Group.20°
186. Id. at arts. 31-33.
187. Id.
188. Id. at arts. 16-21.
189. Id. at arts. 22-30.
190. Id. at arts. 16 & 19.
191. Mauritz, supra note 12.
192. OPP, supra note 116, at art. 17.
193. Id. at art. 20.
194. Id. at art. 19(IX).
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C. BASIS FOR POLICY COORDINATION AND A MODERATING ROLE.
Formal policymaking structures can only provide a partial picture of how MERCO-
SUR policymaking takes place. The real picture is revealed through an analysis of who has
the power, how policymaking disputes are resolved, and how open and ultimately account-
able, the decisionmaking process is in practice. These characteristics affect policymaker's
ability to affect economic and political liberalization. These questions are addressed in
turn below.
The overall formal decision-making structure reflects that each party in the Group,
Council, and JPC has proportional representation-one state, one vote. 20 1 Despite this pro-
portional voting scheme, it nevertheless appears that Brazil and Argentina command supe-
rior economic and political resources. Consequently, their opposition to a proposed deci-
sion, resolution, or rule has more potential impact from an operational standpoint,
because MERCOSUR's legal structure, including Council decisions and Group resolutions,
is democratic.
Obtaining members' assent on a common policy requires great effort toward reaching
consensus. Indeed, reaching consensus among the potentially conflicting interests of mem-
ber states with a different mix of goods to sell is an ongoing challenge. Recent major con-
flicts regarding the import and export of automobiles between Brazil and Argentina expose
this critical tension.202 Accordingly, the "big two"- Argentina and Brazil-dominate but no
one country has sufficient power to solely dominate through its institutional arrangements.
Another key question is the role which MERCOSUR's decision-making structure will
play in mediating between unproductive domestic pressure groups of member states who
seek protection and liberalization-minded reformers. It is still too soon to tell how well
such interests will be balanced over the long run. What is apparent is that even though
MERCOSUR has limited competencies, lobbying will become a focal point of activity as
MERCOSUR rulemaking starts to become more extensive. For the moment, however,
observers see that lobbying is focused on the highest ultimate decisionmakers the presi-
dents and foreign policy, trade, and finance officials in each country. Beyond an under-
standing of formal structure and the apparent distribution of decisionmaking power
among the Council, Group, and other forums, lies the issue of openness in decisionmak-
ing, including clarity of rules, or transparency.
Transparency is an important, but elusive concept for two reasons. One, transparency
is an important concept because it is a key measure of how well MERCOSUR functions
and is accountable to the public for its decisions. 203 Two, transparency is an elusive con-
cept because the term is susceptible of so many different meanings. Transparency may be
defined, in its broadest sense, as an open or clear decision-making process, including fol-
lowing known procedures to arrive at decisions and issuing substantive rules which follow
therefrom and are the true basis for implementation of policy.204 Transparency can also
be defined by what it is not: opaque decisionmaking processes driven by private interests,
201. Id.
202. See Reid, supra note 6, at 11 (discussing Sarney-Alfonsin Accord). Interestingly, the Treaty of
Asunci6n and history of subsequent protocols and other documents reflect that automobiles
have been excluded from tariff guidelines along with another unique product, sugar.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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without regard for or accountability to, the public.20 5 Yet these two reasons, despite their
apparent simplicity, are troublesome because transparency is a relative term.
For example, an executive official in government typically has the right to have certain
conversations with assistants kept confidential. 20 6 Likewise, certain public documents may
be privileged and not subject to open public scrutiny.207 Moreover, certain meetings may
take place at which public matters are disclosed privately.208 A public institution (for
example, central bankers) may fail to disclose the guideline criteria used to make certain
decisions. Does this mean that transparency does not exist in these respective circum-
stances? Unless one adopts an absolute view, the answer is no because in each of the above
situations, the confidentiality which is taking place is due to a special circumstance. But in
all the above cases, public policy is articulated later in some type of public document
which typically lays out the new policy or rule and describes the reason for action. The
transparency concept is therefore a matter of degree and definition.
The public nature of decisionmaking in the Group, Council, and JPC suggests that the
process will have certain elements of procedural openness which makes for transparently
applied rules. This does not mean, however, that the process is necessarilly fully open or
transparent. For example, no prohibition exists on discussing issues in private and then
merely agreeing on privately ratified issues in a public display.
Nevertheless, the fact that clear rules exist which the various states are to abide by sug-
gests that there is an emerging structure of transparency wherein the formal rules are fol-
lowed to the exclusion of private agendas. This arrangement is superior to the alternative
of unwritten norms of doing business or an operational code, including extralegal means
such as corruption. In this regard, however, it would help to have a clear system of
enforcement with strong penalties to encourage MERCOSUR officials to disclose conflicts
of interest and act in the public interest. Further steps to monitor public accountability
through disclosure of finances and other relevant information should also be considered
on an institutional level.209
The degree of transparency and early commitment to economic and political liberal-
ization are only two measures of success. Just as important is the ability to moderate ten-
sions through a strong institutional structure. So far, member states have opted for a cen-





209. Some commentators could perceive that transparency is subordinate to the need to simply devel-
op a structure which is minimalist. See e.g., Reid, supra note 6, at 16-17, 22. See also
<http://.invertir.com>. The principle argument here is that a greater-bigger bureaucracy is need-
ed to resolve issues on a broader and day to day, level. Certainly, truly critical issues, such as cus-
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tion bias (in the customs case, where border delays are a half day or greater) and the creation of




each of the states, who then hammer out agreements.2 11 Accordingly, the question of how
MERCOSUR moderates tensions is ultimately a state issue rather than a MERCOSUR
issue. Still, to the extent that MERCOSUR's benefits extend to particular states in a way
which achieves common overall benefits, public opinion is likely to support MERCOSUR
actions which moderate national demands. Thus, even if strong narrow interest group
pressure arises, the presence of strong public opinion is a positive factor which should not
be discounted at this point.
Moreover, the signatories broad understanding of MERCOSUR relies on a certain
degree of liberalization, in various dimensions, to achieve its ends. A state which does not
embark on such liberalization or starts on a course in the contrary direction is likely to
receive less foreign investment if it adopts a state intervention mentality. Accordingly, one of
the most fundamental distinctions of MERCOSUR versus previous sub-regional integration
efforts, particularly the Andean Pact, is that it is truly concerned with liberalization.2 12
In terms of the political liberalization dimension, member states of MERCOSUR
recently signed a democracy guarantee clause in response to the recent coup attempt in
Paraguay.213 The signing of this clause indicates that the stable political liberalization objec-
tive is strong because the guarantee dause provides for the ability of a member state to be
removed from MERCOSUR if it adopts a form of government which is not democratic. 214
D. THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM.
A dispute resolution mechanism is an essential but advanced feature of a trading
regime. The two basic documents which are the focal points in the MERCOSUR dispute
resolution mechanism are the Protocol of Brasilia (BP) and the OPP, including its
Annex.215 Both documents set forth institutional structures as well as procedures.2 16 The
formal system is principally a legalistic system rather than a power-oriented system
because it is centered around the resolution of disputes through adjudication rather than
negotiation.2 17 Nevertheless, negotiation is the first optional step in the process for all dis-
putes and it appears particularly important in matters relating to the interpretation of the
Treaty and successor documents. 2 18 The goals of the dispute resolution system will affect
the types of decisions which arise. Accordingly, this sub-part will first review the basic
methods used to resolve disputes before analyzing whether such methods contribute to a
sound and workable dispute resolution mechanism. The issues of standing and subject
211. Id.
212. See e.g., O'Hop, supra note 17, at 140-44.
213. Id. See also Reid, supra note 6, at 6.
214. Id.
215. See generally OPP, supra note 116; A.G. Bidart, Un Enfoque Sobre Procedimientos No Adversariales
y Arbitrales En El MERCOSUR, J.A., Jan. 10, 1996.
216. See generally OPP, supra note 116; BP, supra note 199. The concepts of "standing" and "subject
matter jurisdiction" are not articulated as such in the respective Protocols. Nevertheless, these
terms are used for reader's convenience because they articulate the concepts of who gets to bring
a dispute (standing) and what types of disputes the arbitral tribunal may hear (subject matter
jurisdiction) in a manner which encapsulates these issues, without loss of substance.
217. OPP, supra note 116.
218. Id.
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matter jurisdiction, settlement, and initiation of a complaint or dispute through resolution
are discussed in turn.
The OPP spells out the parties who may participate and the types of dispute which may
be heard. 2 19 Both states and individuals can participate as parties with standing in a
dispute.220 With respect to disputes concerning the interpretation, application or non-fulfil-
ment of the provisions of the Treaty or agreements included within its framework, decisions
of the Council, resolutions of the Group and Directives of the Commission, only state parties
can participate (these disputes are hereinafter referenced as Track 1 disputes).221
By contrast, an additional track or process exists regarding complaints to the
Commission, which can originate from the national sections of the Commission and can
initially be brought forward by state parties or individuals, whether natural or legal per-
sons (hereinafter referenced as Track 2 disputes). 222 The subject matter of such com-
plaints can also relate to controversies as to the interpretation, application or compliance
with the Treaty and its various successor documents, as well as the decisions of the
Council, resolutions of the Group, and Directives of the Commission.223 However, an
additional basis for Commission subject matter jurisdiction exists in the form of adminis-
trative or illegal actions of the state parties which restrict, discriminate, or otherwise vio-
late the above mentioned Treaty, successor legal documents, and decisions included in the
decision-making apparatus. 224
Curiously, although article 1 of the OPP Annex provides for origination of complaints
by state parties or individuals, article 2 states that only the complainant state party shall
submit its complaint to the Chairman of the Commission.225 Individual parties therefore
do not have standing by themselves to follow through on complaints in the Commission,
regardless of whether the complaints involve Treaty interpretation or discrimination type
issues. This is an area of ambiguity which could use clarification from MERCOSUR at
some point. Complainants before the Commission also have the option of moving direct-
ly to the BP dispute settlement process including raising complaints to a Commission set-
ting in addition to the Annex of OPP resolution mechanism steps.226 How each of these
options work in a step by step fashion and the relevant key rules are set out below.
The first step for a state party in a Track 1 dispute regarding interpretation of the
Treaty, its successor documents, and the decisions of its organs (hereinafter referred to as
article 2 organs) is to engage in direct negotiation, informing the Ministry of the
Secretariat and the Group.227 If such negotiations do not resolve the dispute, then a party
may submit the dispute to the Group.228 The Group will allow each party to present its
case, and an expert will be selected from a list to the Group.229 On conclusion of this
219. Id. at art. 43 and Annex to Protocol art. 1.
220. Id. at Annex art. 1.
221. Id. at art. 43.
222. Id. at art. 21.
223. Id. at art. 43.
224. Id. at art. 25.
225. Id. at Annex arts. 1 & 2.
226. Id. at art. 21.
227. BP, supra note 116, at arts. 2 & 3.
228. Id.
229. Id. at arts. 4, 6.
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process, a recommendation is made and the process is concluded within thirty days of the
submission of the controversy for the Group's consideration. 230 If the above procedure
does not resolve the dispute, then an arbitral procedure can be utilized. 231
No dispute is permissible relating to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal as long as
one party submits a dispute.232 The arbitral panel is composed of arbitrators selected from a
list of ten designated arbitrators who are registered with the Administrative Secretariat.233
The parties can designate one arbitrator, with the third arbitrator being determined by com-
mon assent of the parties.234 Such arbitrator cannot be a national of either of the state par-
ties and should be named within fifteen days of the date that the Administrative Secretariat
communicates the intention to commence arbitration. 235 Other substitute arbitrators can
also be named in the event of incapacity.236 If the parties cannot agree on any of the arbitra-
tors within a fifteen day period, the Administrative Secretariat will appoint their own arbitra-
tor from the respective lists submitted.237 Moreover, if the parties agree, the Administrative
Secretariat may appoint an arbitrator from a list of sixteen arbitrators available through the
Group.238 Such selection can be made at the request of either party.239 (A provision is also
made for multi-party disputes in the sense that two state parties with the same position can
also take sides against another party.)240
The arbitral tribunal will fix its own rules of procedure, guaranteeing a fair and equal
opportunity to be heard in an expeditious manner.241 This mechanism is for the claims of
private persons (natural or legal) as to the restrictive practices, discriminatory conduct, or
unfair competition arising from member states actions violating the Treaty or.its succes-
sors, Council decisions, or Group resolutions. Parties are to submit the terms of reference
and may have the assistance of lawyers to present their case.242 The tribunal also has the
power, in the event of irreparable harm, to award interim relief.243 The parties, legal
sources can consist of the Treaty, successive provisions, as well as applicable principles of
230. d. at arts. 5 & 6.
231. See generally id. at ch. IV.
232. Id. at arts. 7 & 8. Of course, this literal language is likely subject to a common sense interpreta-
tion. For example, the court could deem that it has the competence to decide any dispute which
has a nexus to the relevant body of MERCOSUR treaty and successor provisions, Council deci-
sions, and Group resolutions. The arbitration panel could also further articulate the limits of its
competency, so long as it has the authority to do so within the body of the arbitrators' opinion.
This certainly seems logical. The alternative is that the arbitration panel does not have the
authority, once the terms of reference are submitted, to determine its own jurisdiction. This is
patently absurd.
233. Id. at art. 10.
234. Id. at art. 9(ii).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at art. 11.
238. Id. at art. 12.
239. Id.
240. Id. at art. 14.
241. Id. at art. 15.
242. Id. at arts. 16 & 17.
243. Id. at art. 18.
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international law and an exaquo et bono power of the arbitrators, if the parties agree.244
The decision of the arbitral tribunal must be written within sixty days and the majority
decision is to be adopted. 245 The voting is confidential and no dissent is allowed. 246 Also
no appeal can be raised and the party should comply within fifteen days of the arbitral
decision or order.247 Fifteen days are available for clarification of the tribunal's decision,
whose response is due back from the tribunal within fifteen days thereafter. 248 If the par-
ties do not comply within thirty days, the parties to the dispute can take compensatory
measures such as suspending concessions.249 Each party pays for their own costs. 250
Track 2 issues are substantively different These issues are regarding legal or adminis-
trative sanctions by one party, as discussed in article 25 of the BP, and have a separate
mechanism. This mechanism is for the claims of private persons (natural or legal) as to
the restrictive, discriminatory effects, or unfair competion arising from member states
action violating the Treaty or its successor, Council decision, or Group resolutions.
Affected parties of a state can refer to the national section of the Group their complaint for
the national section's review. 251 If this controversy has not been subject to negotiation or
arbitration pursuant to the Chapter II, III, or IV arbitral process above described, then the
national section can look for an immediate solution within the Group. 252 If fifteen days
lapse without further action being taken to resolve the matter, the Group, on presentation
by the national section, can review the matter.2 53 If the matter -is not rejected by the
Group, a group of experts can be convened within thirty days. These experts are to listen
and hear evidence regarding the particular claims. 254 The panel of experts will consist of
three members designated by the Group from a list of twenty-four persons. 255 Each of the
state parties will submit the names of six persons who are well known and deemed objec-
tive by them to review the controversy.256
An additional procedure exists for bringing in experts if the parties do not agree. The
experts then state their position to the Group and the state party who is the subject of correc-
tive measures. Fifteen days from that date must lapse to go to the arbitral tribunal option.257
For complaints submitted to the OPP, for the Commission's review by national sec-
tion members, the procedure begins by the complainant state party taking its complaint to
the Chairman of the Commission.258 If no decision is reached, the Commission passes the
file onto a technical committee which shall prepare a joint opinion on the matter within
244. Id. at art. 19.
245. Id. at art. 20.
246. Id.
247. Id. at art. 21.
248. Id. at art. 22.
249. Id. at art. 23.
250. Id. at art. 24.
251. Id. at arts. 25 & 26.
252. Id. at art. 27.
253. Id at art. 29.
254. Id. at art. 29(ii)-(iii).
255. Id. at art. 30(i).
256. Id. at art. 30(ii).
257. Id. at art. 32.
258. OPP, supra note 116, at Annex art 2.
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thirty calendar days. 259 The Commission shall rule on the complaint at its first ordinary
meeting although the conclusions of the experts making up the technical committee are
not binding.260 Moreover, the experts can submit differing opinions therefore allowing for
dissent.261 If consensus cannot be reached, the Commission shall submit to the Group
various alternatives proposed. The Group shall give a decision within thirty calendar days
of receipt.262 If the Group agrees that the complaint is justified, the state party shall, with-
in a reasonable time fixed by the Commission or the Group adopt such measures. 263 In
the event of non compliance, the complainants may go to the Arbitral Tribunal.2 64
Moreover, complainants of the state party may go directly to this latter procedure and
bypass the Group, if they so desire.265
E. PROSPECTS FOR CERTAINTY AND STABILITY IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
The importance of a dispute resolution mechanism is that it signals to foreign
investors the presence of a stable system of protecting their interests. Although attraction
of foreign capital is not one of the primary goals of MERCOSUR, it is nevertheless an
important unwritten objective. The MERCOSUR dispute resolution mechanism, although
at an early stage, should assist in achieving this unwritten objective so long as it is per-
ceived as fair and reasonably efficient in its disposition of disputes. One overarching prac-
tical constraint to this discussion is a telling fact; although the dispute resolution system
has been in place since 1991, it has apparently not reached a point where an arbitral panel
has been convened. 266 Rather, disputes, as for example between Argentine-Brazil auto
import-exports, have been mediated at the highest political level. 267 This example is
unlikely to be the case indefinitely, but until an arbitration panel handles a "live" dispute, it
is difficult to evaluate the practical effectiveness of the process. 268 It is possible to speculate
that the operational code is to handle potential disputes through private or public good
259. Id. at Annex arts. 2 & 3.
260. Id. at Annex art. 4.
261. Id. at Annex arts. 3 &4.
262. Id. at Annex art. 5.
263. Id. at Annex art. 6.
264. Id.
265. Id. at Annex art. 7.
266. Reid, supra note 6, at 11.
267. Id. The automotive industry has been an area of trade policy contention throughout, although it
represents one of the biggest areas of growth in intra- MERCOSUR trade. Brazil has placed a
70% tariff on imported cars, so long as maufacturing plants were not-present, and a 35% tariff if
the manufacturer had a Brazilian plant. Argentina's car manufacturers, many of whom have
plants in both locales, became enraged. The result: the dispute was resolved through an overall
deal until the year 2000 to dilute production in Brazil. This is accomplished with a duty free rate
for Argentine cars into Brazil, provided a 60% MERCOSUR content is present Argentine manu-
facturers alone have a 35% tariff applied to their products. Both countries are benefiting from
this deal as car maufacturers seek to leverage Argentina's rich market with Brazil's huge market.
See Reid, supra note 6, at 11. See also Common Market Resolution No. 29/94.
268. See Reid, supra note 6, at 11. Telephone inquiries and a conference with the MERCOSUR
Administrative Secretariat failed to reveal the presence of any live disputes as well. Id.
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offices before the dispute is exposed to the light of day. On the other hand, it could also be
that five years since the Treaty and less than a year since the CET went into effect, no seri-
ous disputes have arisen, which require the conflict to be placed in the dispute resolution
pipeline. This seems unlikely; common sense suggests that commercial disputes are a fact
of life in commercial relationships. Extralegal or political means are therefore being
deployed at the highest level to resolve such issues, which effectively means that the top
executive officers of major nations and their aides must step aside from their day to day
duties to address such issues, rather than allow the law, through the above decentralized
process, to work.
The formal dispute resolution mechanism is broadly modeled on the United States-
Canadian Free Trade Area (CFTA approach later used in NAFTA) which has been highly
successful in that area.26 9 For example, both systems allow for early negotiation, followed
by review of certain provisions and technical issues such as dumping of goods, and retain
binational (or multinational) panels of experts from whom to select as arbitrators. The
current OPP mechanism also reflects an important adaptation from the approach used in
the BP, namely that arbitral panel decisions are no longer confidential. 270 This should
allow the development of a body of jurisprudence which can guide potential disputants as
to how the legal sources of MERCOSUR are interpreted in the various forms provided. It
seems likely that the complaint system of the Commission continues the general process of
adjudication of disputes over negotiation as the preferred means for resolution of such
complaints. This is not surprising given the fact that the type of disputes brought to the
Commission, such as disputes regarding discrimination, are technical in nature. Moreover,
the OPP continues the previous framework of allowing broader issues relating to Treaty
interpretation and other issues to be reviewed using the BP process. This suggests that
these type of issues relating to broader, more fundamental concerns will be subject to
negotiation first, reflecting a preference for a more political process.
As shown above, various types of disputes and means of resolving them exists within
the MERCOSUR system. Article 1 and article 25 of the BP set forth the parameters of the
different types of disputes involving complaints by national sections, as well as the more
general controversies relating to interpretation, application or compliance with the Treaty
and its successor, documents and decisions of its decision-making bodies, as well as actions
of the parties relating to restrictive practices, anti-discrimination or competition law.271
State parties also have the opportunity to resolve disputes through negotiation first and
bypass the Commission as to disputes relating to interpretation, application and non-ful-
filment of the provisions of the Treaty, its successor agreements and actions of article 2
OPP organs. This provides options to a party who prefers the diplomatic or political route
over the more technical Commission route for isues of broader scope.
Cases involving interpretation, application, and non-fulfillment of Treaty provision
are the kinds of matters which are designed by the Treaty founders to be pursued in a flexi-
269. For an exposition of NAFTA, see generally, NAFTA: A NEw FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS (1994). In particular see Chapter 14 written by H.E. Moyer, Jr.,
"Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Binational Panels as the Trade Courts of Last Resort" and Chapter 15
written by J.P. Bialos & D.E. Siegal, "Dispute Resolution under the NAFTA: The Newer and
Improved Model".
270. OPP, supra note 116, at art. 39.
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ble manner. It is in the interests of any party to try to settle a dispute without engaging any
kind of adjudication for time and money is saved. The fact that such matters are reviewed
within this type of internal diplomatic process allows the state party to find some kind of
face-saving measure before it is faced with the reality of violation of its own rule. At this
point, whichever way a party goes, the response is a legalistic system for the resolution of
the dispute. But, if an expeditious solution or a more legalistic approach is preferred, then
this approach may be taken first.
Some authors have said that subjecting any international trade dispute to a transparent
legal process is a bad idea in principle because "wrong" cases are brought forward. 272
Wrong cases are those matters in which domestic politics can box in the options of the state
member who has taken up the cause of its national industry or sector, even if it has a losing
cause. In this situation, the state party is in a lose-lose position for the state party loses in the
relevant MERCOSUR body and on the domestic front However, this type of situation is
precisely the point of dispute resolution mechanism. A dispute resolution mechanism's
function is to give voice to disputes and provide an opportunity for their resolution.
Parties must be sensitive to the political as well as legal reality. Whether the remain-
ing system is rule based and formally driven by the rules or merely rule-oriented in that
politics plays a background role, the problem is how to accommodate losers. In any event,
as critics from the above "wrong cases" school point out, the airing of such differences does
not appear to have hurt in the development of GATT.273 Further, over-politicization of
the process defeats the purpose of establishing stable, predictable norms. Resolving this
tension obviously requires a delicate balancing act at times for disputes escalate and the
atmosphere relations between member states becomes poisoned. All in all, the view that
open airing of differences is better than the alternative when such differences are unavoid-
able and their very public nature can lead to a reasonable compromise.
The presence of a dispute resolution mechanism, which offers the opportunity for a
body of jurisprudence, can attract foreign investment and in this way, stimulate economic
growth and development. 274 To the extent that this takes place, nationalism can be subor-
dinated within its proper legal context and the persistent tension between economic con-
servatism and liberalism can be partially mediated through the dispute resolution process.
On the other hand, a MERCOSUR court, with supranational power, not come about
although it has been proposed.275 It seems a long way away since Brazil supports the idea
in principle but is unwilling to cooperate further.
271. Id. at art. 21 & BP, arts. 21 &25.
272. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 67,78 (1987).
273. Id.
274. It should be noted that the Calvo clause or doctrine, the historic Latin American wide legal basis
for not allowing foreign investors to use their own fora in international commercial disputes, left
the domestic courts of Latin America as the only remaining dispute resolution option. This
approach has been modified by the inclusion of arbitral provisions in certain bilateral investment
treaties which provide for arbitration in ICSID or under UNCITRAL rules by an impartial inter-
national body. See Treaty between U.S. and Argentine Republics Concerning Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Nov. 14, 1991, (cited in Diego Cesar Bunge,
Southern Cone Perspectives on NAFTA, in NAFTA AND BEYOND 556 (Joseph J. Norton ed., 1995)).
275. 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 42, supra note 10.
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It is difficult to argue with an apparent absence of irreconcilable conflict. This is par-
ticularly so since the emphasis on liberalization reflects favorably so far on a regime of
commercial and legal stability. Still, skeptical observers will no doubt appreciate that the
operation of a dispute resolution system can only be revealed when tested. Without such
test the best that can be said is that in theory, the MERCOSUR dispute resolution system
appears to present a good, but flawed beginning to resolve conflict. The evaluation is
therefore positive because no major problems can be identified which have not been
worked out through the diplomatic or political process and the formal system, similar to
NAFTA and used in a MERCOSUR context, is a reasonably transparent and procedurally
fair system with many opportunities provided to the parties to settle their grievances
through the appropriate channel which fits their needs. However, a flawed system is evalu-
ated because despite this informal and formal set up, the system has yet to be tested and a
centralized system of decisionmaking by the respective Presidents simply does not make
sense over the long run because of inefficiencies. Moreover, the degree of real transparen-
cy in the system can only be evaluated in a limited way, given the apparent lack of disputes.
A real sense of how MERCOSUR decisions are respected in member states can be evaluat-
ed afte a legal test. Until then, the ways in which politics affects dispute resolution must be
watched closely to see what types of informal or formal norms or custom develops as the
operational code for dispute resolution.
V. The Outward Expansion Dimension.
A. POLICY CHOICE LINKAGES WITH NORTH OR SOUTH, OR A MIDDLE WAY.
Even if the legal rules generated are convergent and institutions are in place to support
the process of legal reform, MERCOSUR will not thrive unless it can expand and grow. In
addition to the 40 percent growth in intra MERCOSUR trade during the 1990-95 period,
the rise in extra-MERCOSUR trade is important.276 Such external trade growth depends
in part on how MERCOSUR fits within a global web of emerging international relation-
ships with other preferential trading agreements.and ad hoc international ties. Thus, the
integration problems and prospects of MERCOSUR depend on the external dimension as
part of a world wide regional integration phenomenon. The core issue is whether the
architecture of MERCOSUR is sufficiently open to create trade, and if so, whether the right
kind of trade policy is in place to support it.
In recent years, leading trade scholars have analyzed the costs and benefits of economic
integration.277 Scholars have focused on the relative merits of trade models favoring a New
International Economic Order (NIEO) made of South-South integration alliances to a
North-South integration model. These bilateral alliances and preferential trade agreements
276. See Reid, supra note 6, at 6. This is the theme of the De Jonquierie: article, supra note 14, dis-
cussing the IADB-Yeats report on the perceived tradeoff between internal and external trade
growth, particularly with respect to the capital goods growth internally; see also M. Schiff, Small
is Beautiful (IMF Working Paper No. 1668, 1996) (impact of country size, market share, efficien-
cy and trade policy).
277. Cf. Melo & Panagariya, supra note 26; Hudgins, supra note 27.
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are permissible exceptions to the GATT-WTO trading regime under certain conditions.278
In basic terms, the prevailing view is that the South-South integration alternative has
proved weak. The empirical evidence shows that South-South linkages generally combine
weak economies with limited international bargaining power together without producing
sufficient economies of scale.279 The focus now turns to whether North-South integration
can counter these weaknesses by providing complementary market access to goods and
services without producing adverse effects from economic dependency. MERCOSUR
appears to be on a middle path between the above two broad models by seeking world
wide linkages to expand trade options rather than aligning itself firmly within any of the
above approaches.280 Such a middle way would have some of the characteristics of both
North and South alliances and their fit within a particular model would depend upon the
specific bargaining issues and the configuration of products to be sold. An analysis of the
economic and legal framework to implement MERCOSUR's external trade policy is dis-
cussed below along with an exposition of the current trend and discussion of which policy
alternative may be preferable.
B. REGIONAL ECONOMIC AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR INTEGRATION WITH THE
NORTH, SOUTH, AND A MIDDLE WAY.
Three core linkage alternatives exist which occur across the hemisphere: NAFTA,
FTs, and selective linkages across Latin America. Also, the possibility of an Atlantic link-
age exists through increased cooperation with the EU and the possibility of a more formal
linkage, most probably an FTA, after the year 2005. Lastly, a Pacific linkage exists through
the possibility of trade pacts with ASEAN and with Japan in a bilateral deal.
These linkage alternatives do not break down in a simple North-South, South-South
dichotomy. Rather, they are mixed alternatives which are formed more on geographical
lines than on a more developed-less developed country basis. However, the dichotomy still
persists for the possibility of trade linkages with the United States, E.U., and Japan repre-
sent deals with states of the North generally (exception of Mexico in NAFTA), while the
possibility of increased linkages in the South is the basic idea behind MERCOSUR's move
to bring in its Latin neighbors. The FTAA idea, because of the presence of North and South
states, is obviously mixed as is the ASEAN alternative. Therefore, the potential alliances
described below should be viewed with respect to how they fit within the old paradigm of
North-South and South-South, or whether they represent a potentially new departure of a
middle way formed along geographic and specific product lines in which combinations of
comparative advantage lie. By combinations of comparative advantage, this author refers to
trade deals in which each party can use their respective positions to sell goods which they
can produce more cheaply to sell to the other party in various product niches.
278. See Jackson, supra note 25. Cf. J.H. Jackson, Regulating International Economic Behaviour-
Reflections on the Broader Settings of International Financial Markets and Institutions, in EMERGING
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (??? ed., 1996).
279. Id. at 14-18.
280. This is certainly the current trend since MERCOSUR has not committed itself firmly to joining
any particular group, but rather is seeking deals with a variety of blocs.
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For example, in the dassic case about which David Ricardo talked Portuguese wine was
exchanged for British textiles, thereby allowing each country to specialize in a particular
good.281 As a consequence, each country could sell better products because the production of
its specialty good was better and cheaper. In the context of regional trade deals, the same basic
logic holds, except that it is carried to another level of complexity. At the regional trade level,
many more goods exist and countries will seek special favors for certain industries, regardless
of whether it operates within a strategy which will result in greater productivity. Thus, the
basic underlying logic of the trade deal in a dynamic real world setting mixes the protection of
political interests of certain companies and industry sectors or product lines with a general
lowering of trade barriers to increase trade overall and in specific goods.
The biggest united markets in the world are the United States, the E.U., Japan, and
MERCOSUR, in that order. The biggest markets for MERCOSUR goods varies widely
from country to country and product to product. In MERCOSUR itself, Brazil and
Argentina form 97 percent of the current internal market. 28 2
Overall, the E.U. is the biggest trading partner with the United States insecord fol-
lowed by Asia. 283 Nevertheless, the area for the biggest possibility for growth is generally
considered to be the U.S. market because it takes up a wider percentage of "value-added"-
i.e., manufactured goods. The trade statistics by country and by respective interests vary
widely. For example, Brazil is truly a global trader while Argentina's interests are more
focused on South America, North America, and Europe.284 Indeed, Brazil represents a
major additional market for Argentina (30 percent), while Argentina is but a modest addi-
tion to the Brazilian trading regime (10 percent). 285 Likewise, the importance of interna-
tional trade within a given economy varies widely. Brazil and Argentina's economies rely
20 to 24 percent, respectively, on exports as a percentage of gross domestic product.286
Therefore, expanding trade is an important feature of the economic growth equation.
Convergence with NAFTA may be the leading option for expanding international trade.
Consequently, the first step in analysis is a basic understanding of core NAFTA institu-
tions, its approaches to rules, and its expansion goals. NAFTA is a $6.5 trillion (1993) free
trade area among the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 287 While it maintains a weak
Secretariat, it has a well established dispute resolution system for trade disputes as well as
policymaking bodies and technical committees. The broad policy details are handled by
diplomats from all three countries. By contrast to MERCOSUR, NAFTA does not have
goals of common external policy setting, including a common external tariff.288 Rather,
NAFTA relies exclusively on rules of origin to determine which products come from a par-
ticular country and what type of treatment it will therefore receive within the regime.289
281. An excellent discussion of trade theory from Ricardo to the present "new trade theory" is con-
tained in Paul R. Krugman, Making Sense of the Competitiveness Debate; OXFORD REv. OF ECON.
PoL'Y, Dec. 1996.
282. See <http://www.iadb.org.>, supra note 13 (for basic statistics).
283. Id.
284. See <http://www.demon.co.uk>.
285. Id. See also <http://www.invertir.com>.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Edwin F. Einstein, Nafta Trade in Goods, in NAFTA AND BEYOND 528 (Joseph J. Norton ed., 1995).
289. Id. at 61-66.
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NAFTA has sought to align itself with trading partners such as Chile, but the U.S.
Congress refused to allow Chile in. This refusal was caused in part by other agenda items
receiving higher priority by the U.S. Congress and the Clinton administration. This "go
slow" approach was partially the result of wariness to expand NAFTA after the crisis pre-
cipitated by the 1994 devaluation of the Mexican peso. Chile was predicted to become a
full member early in the Clinton second term, but the lack of any high profile Clinton ini-
tiatives thus far in this area suggest that such effort has been slowed or stalled by other
basic foreign policy concerns, such as getting top officials appointed.
The 1991 Rose Garden agreement is the basis for a 4 + 1 legal framework which allows
for cooperation, if not marriage, between the United States, MERCOSUR, and other states.
It is expected to provide the basis for a greater FTA and a web of associated affiliations
throughout the hemisphere.290 It may also be the primary legal means to bridge the
NAFTA FTA with the more sweeping MERCOSUR trade framework. Nevertheless, a
number of legal, economic, and geopolitical reasons exists with respect to why such an
alliance will not emerge swiftly.
First, the stated objectives of NAFTA and MERCOSUR are not compatible. 29 1
MERCOSUR's emphasis on free movement of goods with a CET, and a free movement of
capital, labor, and services, as well as harmonization of laws, and macroeconomic policy is
broad. The institutional framework is also different in structure, although both groups
have weak Secretariats. MERCOSUR is actively expanding its associate membership
through its own 4 + I agreement process and is actively negotiating with a variety of North
and South partners.
By contrast, in article 102, NAFTA states its objectives as the elimination of tariff and
non-tariff barriers, trade, and facilitation of cross-border movement of goods and
services. 291 It also sets forth the promotion of fair competition within the free trade area,
the increase of investment opportunities, and a provision of adequate effective protection
of intellectual property rights. A CET is not part of NAFTA.
Nevertheless, one commentator has suggested that despite the appearance of the
above basic incompatibilities, NAFTA and MERCOSUR have a legal framework which is
actually workable.293 MERCOSUR is, in fact, little more than a free trade area with a par-
tial CET, and its CET will not be in place until the year 2006 for all goods. 294 Further,
MERCOSUR's goals of free movement of labor and macro-economic and exchange rate
policy coordination have been either neglected or minimal. Accordingly, these areas can
be explored later and are not stumbling blocks to building NAFTA-MERCOSUR link-
ages.295 Further, NAFTA rules, to the extent that they are oriented towards liberalization
goals, can be incorporated in most basic areas of MERCOSUR. Also, a dispute resolution
mechanism exists which closely resembles the NAFTA model.
290. <http://www.invertir.com>.
291. See generally Einstein, supra note 288; See also Thomas L. Bloodworth et al., Transborder Supply of
and Investment in Services, in NAFTA AND BEYOND 169,255 (Joseph J. Norton ed., 1995)
292. See generally O'Keefe, supra note 5.
293. Id.
294. O' Keefe, supra note 5, at 9-12. See also BELLO Er AL., supra note 247.
295. O'Keefe, supra note 5, at 9-12.
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On the other hand, the MERCOSUR institutions are now permanent in nature and may
not fit within the NAFTA institutional framework. Moreover, significant sticking points are
likely to arise, such as the strong attention which NAFTA gives to intellectual property rights
in contrast to MERCOSUR. 296 Additionally, MERCOSUR must contend with the fact that
U.S. interest group pressure will emerge in areas such as labor and environment because of the
lower wage rates and perceived lower environmental standards in the Southern Cone. This
was the case in Mexico, prompting the Clinton administration to engage in side accords, prior
to signing NAFTA.297 But, hemispheric integration need not go down the NAFTA-MERCO-
SUR path to become actualized. A potential parallel path exists. Indeed, a legal framework is
being established with various working groups involved in the process of attempting a Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) through the Summit of the Americas process.
The FTAA process took off at the December 1995 Summit of the Americas meeting,
which involved all the states of the Americas, with the exception of Cuba.298 Various
meetings have taken place to follow up the Summit's stated goal of the FTAA by the year
2005.299 U.S. officials have said that they regard the cornerstone of the Summit of the
Americas process is a NAFTA-MERCOSUR merger, and as above indicated, convergence
here should be a lengthy and difficult process. 300 Nevertheless, the U.S. "go slow"
approach coupled with MERCOSUR's leadership in the South has created a situation
where the prospect of a free trade area from Panama to Tierra del Fuego is much more
likely in the near future than achieving such a free trade linkage farther north.
This trend, however, does not diminish the fact that the Summit process, by facilitat-
ing trade liberalization, is slowly advancing MERCOSUR's inclusion in NAFTA in an indi-
rect manner. In fact, the United States recently called on Brazil to help move the process
forward at the upcoming 34 member Summit at Belo Horizonte, Brazil, by encouraging
exploration of each of the two roads and finding a way to smooth these two paths to inte-
gration. Whether the result of these efforts is a "pure" FTAA, a NAFTA-MERCOSUR link
with ancillary FTA's in various "4 + 1" configurations, or 2 parallel tracks in a series of ad
hoc arrangements depends upon Summit as well as bilateral and subregional conversa-
tions and negotiations with each other. How some of these secondary linkages within the
hemisphere are taking shape is discussed further in section (C.) below.
The next major area of potential links is with the E.U.. The legal framework of agree-
ments which MERCOSUR has with the E.U. reflect that cooperation between the E.U. and
MERCOSUR consists of symbolism more than substance at this point.30 1 The text of the
agreements reflect a desire to work together in the future, but do not lay out any specific
working agreements on trade policy, other than the desire to consult each other.
Accordingly, meetings have been undertaken recently between the E.U. and MERCOSUR
in order to begin a joint trade liberalization program with aspirational objectives of a free
trade zone by the year 2005.302
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See Beyond NAFTA, NAFTA L. RE., Winter 1995, at 157.
299. See Comment and Offcial Docments: The Miami Summit NAFTA L. REV., Winter 1995, at 172-
175.
300. 12 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2058 (Dec. 13, 1995).
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By contrast to NAFTA, difficulties in accommodating the legal frameworks in the E.U.
and MERCOSUR are not an issue at present because no real discussion of integration
exists. Cooperation is the goal. Nevertheless, the most sensitive sector to MERCOSUR's
increased cooperation is the European agricultural sector.303 Therefore, it seems that the
future of E.U. MERCOSUR relations is likely to consist of closer embrace to the tentative
one which exists at present: the E.U.-MERCOSUR liberalization plan has more modest
objectives set forth than NAFrA.
The United States, for its part, has said it does not oppose greater MERCOSUR-E.U.
relations consistent with the WTO. Brazil, in particular, is interested in such a relationship
because of its strong exports (primarily agricultural) to the E.U.. Also, the relationship is
consistent with Brazil's policy of playing the United States and NAFTA off against the E.U.
in order to gain bargaining leverage in trade talks.
The other major trading bloc and group is ASEAN and Japan. ASEAN's objective is
likewise based on having closer ties with MERCOSUR, starting with cooperation first and
then moving on to greater integration through its own FTA linkage. 30 4 Japan's goals are
more modest such as expanding bilateral ties to get better inroads into the MERCOSUR
market 305 The ASEAN ties of cooperation, in particular, would not appear to be broadly
inconsistent with MERCOSUR's legal framework of trade liberalization. 30 6 The specific
details of any future deal would show the extent to which the pact is providing more
exemptions to an FTA than covering goods and whether it creates trade.
C. TRENDS AND ANALYSIS OF ONGOING LINKAGES WITH ThE NORTH AND SOUTH.
As indicated above, a variety of efforts are taking place simultaneously with NAFTA,
individual Latin states, the E.U., ASEAN, and Japan. The current day to day focus is inclu-
sion of LAIA member states on a case by case basis under the 4 + 1 agreement plan. Also,
some strong efforts are arising to conclude a free trade deal with the Andean Pact as a whole.
On the other hand, a NAFTA partnership is dearly on the back burner primarily
because of Brazil's stated interest in consolidation of MERCOSUR and the fact that it is
seeking to form the South American Free Trade Association (SAFTA) as a counterweight
to NAFTA. Indeed, Brazil, the economic superheavyweight of Latin America, is using its
position as a large and fast growing market to help improve the conditions of reciprocral
trade agreements to it and MERCOSUR's favor.
Nevertheless, Brazil is not obstructing LAIA member Venezuela from joining as an
associate member, as part of the MERCOSUR 4 + 1 agreement process, nor did it block
Bolivia in 1996.307 Indeed, Venezuela is a highly sought after partner since it is rich in
petroleum and has strong trading relationships in this regard, particularly with Brazil. 308
303. E.U., MERCOSUR Countries -2-: Said Not An Anti-NAFTA Gambit, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE,
Dec. 11, 1995, available in Westlaw, Allnewsplus File.
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No simple answer can determine which of the above relationships makes the best
sense, given MERCOSUR's legal framework, to achieve further development. Still, the
objective of encouraging E.U. and NAFTA competition seems sensible when an economic
comparison is made. 30 9 About 30 percent of MERCOSUR's trade is with the E.U..
Nevertheless, most of this trade is agricultural products. 3 10 For example, in the case of
Brazil, about 60 percent of the goods exported to the E.U. were primary products and only
40 percent were manufactured items.311 By contrast, 75 percent of the products exported
to North America were manufactured goods. 312 This reflects that inclusion in NAFTA has
certain benefits because the market for manufacturing goods may be better in that region-
al arrangement than in the E.U. and more value (or profit) may be added to manufactured
goods than agricultural primary products. Moreover, the E.U's preferential agricultural
agreements with its former colonies and its own protectionism would appear to constrain
the growth of the E.U. MERCOSUR relationship in the long run. Accordingly, at this pre-
liminary stage, the evolution of a legal framework, which can accomodate open doors to
both trading blocs, seems to provide the best approach. Consequently, MERCOSUR has
selected this approach.
Selective linkages with the South also make sense. To the extent that MERCOSUR can
continue to speak with one voice and the market added is consistent with the MERCOSUR
trade liberalization policies, this could prove beneficial in achieving intra-MERCOSUR
economies of scale, specialization, as well as providing a larger, more attractive partner for
trade with the North. This is already happening between Brazil and Argentina as these
states, automobile production facilities and foreign investors seek greater MERCOSUR
access as a platform to trade in an expanded market. Otherwise, inclusion of southern
regimes could bog down MERCOSUR and dilute its core program of liberalization. State
intervention could creep in from the side and dilute the core member states' goals. (State
interventionism is not, however, always pernicious. For example, protectionism can yield
positive benefits in the case of market failure or when concentration yields economies of
scale or specialization. This could, under certain trade theories, be argued as the basis for
developing special protection for the automobile plants that have a binational base in
Brazil and Argentina).
The tension between economic conservatism and liberalism will most likely grow with
the inclusion of states whose economies are more protectionist than the existing core
MERCOSUR states. An unstable or weak MERCOSUR, may be created by this tension in
the long run. Vigilance in policy coherence as to both tariff and non-tariff barriers is
essential. In fact, after first reducing tariff barriers, eliminating nontariff barriers to trade
is the object of focus in MERCOSUR. Issues like reducing customs paperwork at the
respective borders are the next links in the chain toward enhancing efficiency and creating
a truly integrated market.
The configurations which are emerging do not reflect a simple North South or
South-South pattern. Rather, born of an exception in GATT and the WTO for regional






trade agreements, and propelled by stabilization and the success of the Asian model in
export-led growth, they represent a new middle way. This approach is new for several rea-
sons. First, selected Latin America states, through MERCOSUR, can use their own
strengths as a large market to bargain, rather than doing so in a fragmented fashion.
Second, MERCOSUR, can bargain with an unprecedented number of regional blocs on a
bloc by bloc basis as well as within the WTO framework (successive tariff reduction, and
increasing attention to liberalization in agriculture, and services). This approach is a mid-
dle way because it represents a highly fact specific approach to dealmaking rather than a
disproportionate, stark reliance on trade alliances with the North or collective arrange-
ments with the South. This middle way, through its creation of open architecture path-
ways, breaks down the old asymmetrics of dependency and creates the opportunitty to
form relationships on a new set of mutual interests in international development.
Important spinoff benefits arise in that the international community typically
demands certain standards of stability and transparency in its business dealings with trad-
ing partners. As investors increasingly look to MERCOSUR states as a situs for their busi-
nesses where they must have a presence, political stability and some form of democracy
becomes more important. Therefore, political stability and democracy become more
probable within a region where foreign cash flow is fundamental. Likewise, transparency
is likely to follow and make inroads into achieving a more competitive economy by pro-
viding certainty and stability in the interpretation of rules (as well as piercing the veil of
private business empires in the regulatory dimension of services, such as banking and
securities where disclosure is essential to safety and soundness).
However, an important note of caution to the above analysis is needed. A prominent
economist recently claimed that the MERCOSUR trading pattern of expanding trade with-
in its borders deserves a sharp rebuke313 because the rapid growth in intra-MERCOSUR
trade has been married to protectionism competitors outside the MERCOSUR bloc. This
not only represents a retreat from the global trading system, but also potentially promotes
protectionism without productivity gains by providing a false sense of progress through
the new regional trade growth. The long term effect may be to induce industries, which
are effectively importing to substitute within a broader market (e.g., the old policy of
favoring domestic entrepreneurs or the state with selected multinational alliances over true
liberalization).
The counterargument to this perception is that it begs the question for Brazil and
Argentina were peripheral players in the late 1980s and 1990s as they fashioned this new
strategy of integration. Even if the rise in trade growth now is disproportionate due to
capital goods investment it is a net gain and foreign investment continues to pour in.
Indeed, MERCOSUR could do worse. The real danger maybe whether the incipient over-
all level of protectionism reaches the level of returning these member states to the perni-
cious trends of the historical cycle of conservatism-liberalism.
So far, it seems that this danger is present and that caution must be applied by domes-
tic and national authorities to prevent the economist's premise of (over)protectionism to
313. See De Jonquieries, supra note 14.
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become the promise of a closed MERCOSUR which stagnates. Therefore, strong moderat-
ing institutions and leadership, on the MERCOSUR and domestic level, as well as interna-
tional discipline to strengthen the hand of liberalizers in these regimes are needed to pre-
vent some of the worst tendencies of MERCOSUR to become embedded social realities.
As the above analysis shows, various legal frameworks are in place and are emerging to
facilitate expansion of the core. The apparent strategy of seeking the best individual deals
possible, without being wed to a particular bloc, is taking place within this framework and
should provide a useful building block approach to expansion and development at this
stage.
However, the persistent tension between economic conservatism and liberalism must
always be kept in mind since regional trading blocs can devolve into protectionist islands
and disserve the ability of an economy to become productive. Adding additional member
states, as is permissible under the LAIA framework, is not necessarily a guarantee of greater
economic strength and the enhancement of further development.
